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A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE’S TREATMENT OF DE FACTO 
PARENTS 
Robin Fretwell Wilson* 
I. INTRODUCTION1 
On September 11, 2005, Haleigh Poutre suffered a traumatic brain 
injury “similar to those caused by high speed car wrecks.”2 Only eleven 
years old, she was rushed to Noble Hospital in Westfield, Massachusetts, 
with, according to a police report, “both old and new bruises, old and 
new open cuts, several apparent weeping burns, . . . and a subdural 
hematoma [a collection of blood on the surface of the brain].”3 Doctors 
would later determine that Haleigh’s brain stem “was partly sheared.”4 
                                                          
 * I am grateful to the Sidney and Walter Siben Distinguished Professorship Lecture and to 
Professor John DeWitt Gregory for the kind invitation to present this work. I am indebted to 
William Bridges, George Davis, Merilys Huhn, Leona Krasner, Anthony Michael Kreis, and Anna-
Katherine Moody for their diligent, painstaking research assistance and for the assistance of counsel 
for Stitham v. Henderson, Jefferson T. Ashby (plaintiff) and Harold L. Stewart II (defendant); In re 
Guardianship of Estelle, Roxann C. Tetreau (plaintiff) and Mark I. Zarrow (defendant); E.N.O. v. 
L.M.M., Mary L. Bonauto (plaintiff) and E. Oliver Fowlkes (plaintiff); and C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 
Kenneth P. Altshuler (plaintiff) and Mary L. Bonauto (plaintiff). This is for Haleigh Poutre. 
 1. This Article draws on a more complete examination of the American Law Institute’s 
(“ALI”) treatment of de facto parents in Robin Fretwell Wilson, Undeserved Trust: Reflections on 
the American Law Institute’s Treatment of De Facto Parents, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: 
CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 
90, 94-101 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006) [hereinafter RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY], and on an 
empirical study of the impact of the ALI’s recommendations in Michael R. Clisham & Robin 
Fretwell Wilson, American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, Eight Years 
After Adoption: Guiding Principles or Obligatory Footnote?, 42 FAM. L.Q. 573 (2008). 
 2. Buffy Spencer, Expert Testifies About Severity of Brain Injury, REPUBLICAN, Nov. 7, 
2008, at A1. 
 3. Patricia Wen, Accused Stepfather Fights to Keep Girl Alive, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 6, 2005, at 
A1. 
 4. Accused Abuser Seeks to Keep Victim Alive, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 8, 2005, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-12-08/news/0512080202_1_justices-jason-strickland-holli-
strickland. 
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Plunged into a coma, less than two weeks later, Haleigh would 
suffer another blow, losing her adoptive mother, Holli Strickland, in a 
bizarre murder-suicide.5 Her step-father (and the father of her half-
brother), Jason Strickland, stepped forward to make medical decisions 
for Haleigh.6 By this time, Jason had lived with Haleigh for nearly five 
years.7 By his own report, Jason “felt in his heart [that] he was 
[Haleigh’s] father, and the children felt that way toward him.”8 Haleigh’s 
biological father’s parental rights had been terminated long before.9 
During Jason’s marriage to Haleigh’s mother, Jason was  
the person who the children call[ed] daddy, the person who they 
cuddle[d] up to, the person who they play[ed] ball [with] in the 
backyard, the person who they practice[d] with for their softball team, 
or who coache[d] their team, or who [brought] them to their activities, 
or who work[ed] very hard so that their after school activities [could] 
be paid for.10 
A mechanic who worked more than sixty hours a week, Jason 
taught Haleigh how to “work[] on cars.”11 Haleigh “handed him tools 
and . . . kept him company” while he worked.12 Jason “renovat[ed 
Haleigh’s] bedroom, carpeting[,] and wallpapering there and throughout 
the house.”13 On Friday and Saturday nights, the whole family “would 
have movie night. They would all pop corn, sit and watch movies 
together, have family fun, and other relationships.”14 At least one family 
friend believed that “‘Jason seemed to have a heart for Haleigh.’”15 
Under Massachusetts law at the time, Jason Strickland’s request to 
make decisions for Haleigh should have been uncontroversial. 
                                                          
 5. Patricia Wen, Poutre Stepfather Gets 12-15 Years in Prison, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 19, 2008, 
at B1. Holli Strickland died in a murder-suicide with her own grandmother. Id. The Massachusetts 
Department of Social Services took temporary custody of Haleigh and asked that a “do-not-
resuscitate” order be filed for her. See id. Jason then moved to block the order as Haleigh’s de facto 
parent. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 6. Wen, supra note 3; Patricia Wen, Bid to End Life Support Was Quick, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 
7, 2006, at B2. 
 7. Transcript of Hearing on a Motion and Preliminary DNR Hearing at 22, In re Care & Prot. 
of Poutre, No. CP05H0068 (Juv. Ct. Hampden County Sept. 26, 2005) [hereinafter Transcript of 
Hearing]. 
 8. Id. at 12. 
 9. Id. at 13. 
 10. Id. at 10. 
 11. Brief for Petitioner/Appellant Jason Strickland at 30, In re A Juvenile, No. SJC-09629 
(Mass. Sup. Ct. Oct. 6, 2005) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 7, at 10. 
 15. Patricia Wen, Haleigh Reported Hurting Herself, Specialist Says, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 21, 
2008, at B4 (quoting testimony given by former family friend, Stephanie Adams). 
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Borrowing from the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution 
(“Principles”) proposed by the prestigious American Law Institute 
(“ALI”), Massachusetts courts had awarded parental rights to significant 
adults in a child’s life since 1999. Beginning with Youmans v. Ramos,16 
Massachusetts had recognized as de facto parents adults who resided 
with a child and performed as much caretaking as the child’s own parent, 
with that parent’s blessing. Under the ALI’s approach, if Jason had been 
recognized as Haleigh’s de facto parent, he would have been entitled not 
only to visitation, but also to a share of custody if he and Haleigh’s 
mother had divorced.17 He presumably would have also been entitled to 
make medical decisions for Haleigh if her mother could not.18 
Despite clear precedent for naming Jason as Haleigh’s de facto 
father, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that doing 
so would be “unthinkable [under] the circumstances.”19 Together with 
Holli, Jason had subjected Haleigh to an ominous, escalating pattern of 
abuse and neglect over a period of more than three years.20 Long 
                                                          
 16. 711 N.E.2d 165, 167 n.3 (Mass. 1999) (adopting the Principles’ test for de facto parents in 
Massachusetts); see infra app. C, at 1174. 
 17. See infra notes 55-67 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 55-67 and accompanying text. 
 19. In re Care & Prot. of Sharlene, 840 N.E.2d 918, 926-27 (Mass. 2006). Sharlene is a 
pseudonym for Haleigh Poutre. Id. at 920. 
 20. See Wen, supra note 5. Acknowledging that the Massachusetts Department of Social 
Services “missed signs of abuse,” Commissioner Harry Spence called Haleigh’s experience “a 
classic case of conscientious error,” stating that, “[w]e did what we were supposed to do. Everyone 
misread the data before us.” Patricia Wen, DSS Sought Early End to Life Support, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 
20, 2006, at A1. Haleigh’s case file recorded the following incidents and their “resolutions”: 
9/27/02 Child Abuse/Neglect Report. Allegations of neglect and physical abuse of 
[Haleigh] Screened Out. 
10/24/02 Child Abuse/Neglect Report. Screened in for allegations of neglect and 
physical abuse of [Haleigh]. Reporter saw bruises on child, concerns about how child is 
disciplined and child out of school for eight days. 
10/25/02 Child Abuse/Neglect Investigation. Unsupported with no reasonable cause to 
believe that a condition of neglect or physical abuse exists. 
1/6/03 Child Abuse/Neglect Report. Initially screened in for neglect because mother is 
unable to keep child safe from harm then screened out as care and protection referral 
made. 
12/30/03 Child Abuse/Neglect Report. 
1/13/04 Child Abuse/Neglect Report. Allegations of neglect screened out. 
2/23/04 Child Abuse/Neglect Report. Screened in on allegations of neglect. [Ten] year 
old [Haleigh] missing for two hours and finally located in bathroom at Noble Hospital 
which is not close to her home. 
2/23/04 Child Abuse/Neglect Investigation. Unsupported. Child did run away from home 
but mother acted appropriately. 
6/11/04 Child Abuse/Neglect Report. Screened in because [Haleigh] had bruises, not in 
school and does not look as well cared for as other children in the home. 
6/14/04 Child Abuse/Neglect Investigation. Allegations of physical abuse and neglect 
unsupported. [Haleigh] reports that she bruised her face diving into a pool. Mother 
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absences from school, unexplained bruises on Haleigh’s face that were 
chalked up to “diving into a pool,” and headaches and vomiting from 
being “left . . . alone at a softball game [where] she was hit in the head 
with a baseball bat,” all culminated in Haleigh being thrown down the 
stairs, leaving her unconscious.21 When Haleigh arrived at the hospital a 
day later, “Haleigh was barely breathing, unresponsive[,] and covered 
                                                          
responsive to [Haleigh’s] self-abusive behaviors by bringing her to pediatrician and 
following counselor’s recommendations. 
6/18/04 Child Abuse/Neglect Report. Screened in for neglect initially and then screened 
out. Mother addressing issues with child’s therapist, mother agreed to voluntary services, 
child hospitalized and mother working with therapist to get child placed in residential 
care. 
6/25/04 Child Abuse/Neglect Report. Mother’s application for voluntary services 
accepted. 
7/15/04 Child Abuse/Neglect Report. Screened in for physical abuse and neglect of 
[Haleigh] by her mother. [Haleigh] has bruises on arm. 
7/15/04 Child Abuse/Neglect Investigation. Supported for neglect, mother inadequately 
supervised [Haleigh] in store despite prior history of [Haleigh] stealing in a store. 
7/16/04 Child Abuse/Neglect Report. Screened in. Case currently open for voluntary 
services and investigation. 
8/18/04 Child Abuse/Neglect Report. Screened in for neglect. Child received burns 
during a bath then screened out because department is currently involved with family and 
closely monitoring [Haleigh’s] care. 
1/14/05 Child Abuse/Neglect Report. Screened out. 
4/14/05 Child Abuse/Neglect Report. Screened in due to concerns about the level of 
supervision provided for [Haleigh] given the extent of her injuries in light of her history. 
4/14/05 Child Abuse/Neglect Investigation. Allegations of Neglect unsupported. 
5/11/05 Child Abuse/Neglect Report. Screened in due to allegations of neglect. Mother 
did not seek medical attention when [Haleigh] complained of a headache and was 
vomiting. Mother left [Haleigh] alone at softball game and she was hit in the head with a 
baseball bat. 
5/11/05 Child Abuse/Neglect Report. Allegation of neglect unsupported. Incident was an 
accident. Adequate services in place to assist with monitoring. 
9/11/05 Child Abuse/Neglect Report. Screened in for abuse by unknown perpetrator 
based upon the child’s multiple bruises and fractures in different stages of healing. 
9/12/05 Child Abuse/Neglect Investigation. Supported. Reasonable cause to believe that 
a condition of physical abuse and neglect exists. [Haleigh] sustained serious life 
threatening injuries which were the result of trauma. 
In re Sharlene, 840 N.E.2d at 921-22 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted). 
 21. Id. at 921-22; Patricia Wen, Sister, Stepfather to Testify in Poutre Case, BOS. GLOBE, 
Nov. 5, 2008, at B2. According to prosecutor Laurel Brandt, Haleigh’s sister, Samantha Poutre, 
would testify that: 
She saw her stepfather, Jason Strickland, “push Haleigh down the stairs” in the autumn 
of 2005 and that after her violent fall, Haleigh “did not get up,” . . . that her mother, 
Holli[,] . . . was near the stairs at the time[,] and that the couple “tried to wake Haleigh” 
without success . . . . 
  . . . [Samantha will also testify that Jason] later took Haleigh’s unconscious body 
from the bottom of the basement steps and put her in an empty tub in a first-floor 
bathroom. 
Id. 
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with bruises, sores and scabbed-over burns.”22 Haleigh’s “teeth were 
broken, her face was swollen,” and she was “extremely thin, [and] her 
abdomen was sunken.”23 Dr. Christine Barron, a child-abuse specialist, 
would later say that “many of the wounds were telltale signs of cigarette 
burns, ligature marks, and severe whippings with a cord or beltlike 
object.”24 A jury ultimately agreed and convicted Jason of five counts of 
battering Haleigh. In two instances, Jason struck Haleigh with a “‘wand, 
stick or tube’” and hit her “on the head with his hand.”25 In the 
remaining instances, he permitted Holli to inflict injuries on Haleigh 
while he stood by.26 On December 18, 2008, “a judge sentenced 
[Jason] . . . to 12 to 15 years in state prison for participating in a horrific 
pattern of child abuse, saying he had deprived [Haleigh] of the ‘most 
precious gift’ of a normal childhood.”27 
In the days and weeks immediately after Haleigh’s traumatic injury, 
glimmers of Jason’s role began to appear. Given Haleigh’s grim 
prognosis, the Massachusetts Department of Social Services (“DSS”) 
asked the Hampden County Juvenile Court to enter a do-not-resuscitate 
(“DNR”) order in Haleigh’s medical record, a move strenuously opposed 
by Jason. He asked to make decisions for Haleigh as her de facto father 
at the DNR hearing, but exercised his Fifth Amendment prerogative not 
to speak.28 DSS opposed Jason’s request.29 
In denying Jason’s claim to make medical decisions for Haleigh, 
the trial judge concluded that Jason had “not . . . met the specific[] test” 
set forth in Youmans, and that his assertion of the Fifth Amendment 
warranted “a negative inference.”30 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
                                                          
 22. Buffy Spencer, Haleigh Lifeless, ‘Freezing Cold,’ Nurse Testifies, REPUBLICAN, Nov. 6, 
2008, at A1 (quoting testimony of registered nurse Joanne Ghazil, who was “on duty at Noble 
Hospital when Haleigh was brought in”). 
 23. Accused Abuser Seeks to Keep Victim Alive, supra note 4. 
 24. Patricia Wen, Stepfather Convicted in Poutre Abuse Case, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 27, 2008, at 
A1.  
 25. Buffy Spencer, Sentencing Delayed for Jason Strickland, Convicted of Allowing Assault 
on His Stepdaughter, Haleigh Poutre, REPUBLICAN NEWSROOM, Dec. 8, 2008, 
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2008/12/sentencing_delayed_for_jason_s.html. 
 26. The jury found Jason Strickland guilty of “‘assault and battery on a child with substantial 
bodily injury’” because he allowed Holli to strike Haleigh with a bat in his presence and allowed 
Holli to inflict the brain injury that ultimately plunged Haleigh into a coma. Id. 
 27. Wen, supra note 5. 
 28. See In re Care & Prot. of Sharlene, 840 N.E.2d 918, 920, 923 (Mass. 2006); Transcript of 
Hearing, supra note 7, at 24, 28 (DSS argued that Jason “was either participating in the infliction of 
[Haleigh’s] injuries or totally ignoring the fact”). 
 29. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 7, at 20-24. Obviously, Jason had a conflict of interest. 
By insisting that Haleigh remain on life support, Jason could avoid a potential murder charge. Wen, 
supra note 3. 
 30. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 7, at 27-28. 
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Court affirmed.31 The court first acknowledged that Massachusetts had 
embraced the ALI’s test for de facto parenthood, which measures chores 
performed for a child and time spent in residence, not the quality of the 
adult’s relationship with the child.32 The court concluded, however, that 
“[t]o recognize [Jason] as a de facto parent, in order that he may 
participate in medical . . . decision [making for Haleigh] . . . would 
amount to an illogical and unprincipled perversion of the doctrine.”33 
Although Massachusetts’s cases “have focused explicitly on the 
existence of a significant preexisting relationship,” that “standard 
presumes that the bond between a child and a de facto parent will be, 
above all, loving and nurturing.”34 Faced with the ludicrousness of 
giving Haleigh’s abuser parental rights, the court concluded that the 
gravamen of a parent-child relationship—a loving, bonded, dependent 
relationship between the child and that adult—should count. 
                                                          
 31. In re Sharlene, 840 N.E.2d at 926, 930; see E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 890-91 
(Mass. 1999). 
 32. In re Sharlene, 840 N.E.2d at 926 (noting that the court adopted the concept of de facto 
parenthood proposed by the ALI in 1999 but that the court later, in 2003, “noted (without adopting) 
further refinements to the concept”); see E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 891 (referencing the de facto 
parenthood factors proposed by the ALI in 1998); infra app. C, Code 1, at 1174. 
 33. In re Sharlene, 840 N.E.2d at 927. 
 34. Id. at 926 (emphasis added). The day after the court upheld the trial judge’s order 
permitting the removal of Haleigh’s ventilator and feeding tube, Haleigh began to show signs of 
recovery, and the doctors halted plans to let her die. Patricia Wen, The Little Girl They Couldn’t See, 
BOS. GLOBE, July 6, 2008, at A1 (“[Doctors] announced that [Haleigh] was breathing on her own 
and responding to commands.”); see Buffy Spencer, Injured Girl Could Testify, REPUBLICAN, July 
2, 2008, at A1. Haleigh now lives with severe, permanent retardation. See Noel Young, Coma Girl 
Comes Back From the Dead to Testify Against the Stepfather Who Nearly Beat Her to Death, DAILY 
MAIL (Feb. 29, 2008, 08:53 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-522432/Coma-girl-
comes-dead-testify-stepfather-nearly-beat-death.html. 
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Haleigh’s tragic story certainly does not mean that live-in partners35 
should never receive parental rights. However, Haleigh’s experience 
drives home the fact that a thinned-out conception of parenthood, 
measured by chores and time-in-residence, will sometimes permit bad 
risks to remain in a child’s life.36 Although Haleigh’s case is unusual 
because Jason was the only adult decision-maker left in the vacuum 
created by Holli’s death,37 far more often this thinned-out conception of 
parenthood as primarily a function of co-residence would give former 
live-in partners access to a child “over the opposition of the legal 
parent”38—nearly always a child’s mother.39 Mothers are 
disproportionately affected by the extension of new parental rights to 
live-in partners because most non-marital children and children of 
                                                          
 35. This Article uses the term “live-in partner” to describe the population of adults on whom 
the ALI would confer significantly expanded parental rights. The common denominator among this 
group is their previous status as co-residents of the child’s legal parent—nearly always a child’s 
mother—together with their performance of certain “caretaking functions.” See infra Part II. For 
reasons explained infra, this Article’s critique of the Principles’ thinned-out test for parental rights 
for former live-in partners is limited to heterosexual male cohabitants. See infra Part III. 
  The Principles would also extend parent-like rights to another category of adults who live 
with a child—parents by estoppel. The defining characteristic of members of this group is that they 
accept responsibility for the child. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03 cmt. b(ii), at 122 (2000) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]. The legal 
recognition of parents by estoppel is justified in part by expectations of the parties. Id. at 122-23 
(“When this reasonable good faith [that the individual is the parent] exists, the individual is seeking 
status based not solely on his functioning as a parent but on the combination of the parental 
functions performed and the expectations of the parties.”). Legal recognition is also predicated on 
actions that are sufficiently clear and unambiguous to indicate parental status was contemplated by 
all. Id. § 2.03 cmt. b(iii), at 125. Parents by estoppel will often have lived with the child since birth 
and believed themselves to be the child’s biological parent. Id. § 2.03(1)(b)(ii)–(iii), at 122-24; 
Seger v. Seger, 547 A.2d 424, 425, 428 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (granting partial custody and visitation 
to step-father who lived with child’s mother for two years when she informed him she was pregnant 
with his child and who raised and supported the child after she revealed he was not the father, until 
the couple’s break-up). While this Article’s critique is limited to the Principles’ proposed treatment 
of de facto parents, the fact that an adult believes himself to be a child’s biological parent is 
important from a risk assessment perspective and may also influence the benefits to children of 
continuing contact. See infra Part III. 
 36. While the “constitutionally protected status” of the relationship between legal parents and 
their children can and should be policed for child abuse or neglect, until such a showing is made, 
society should be chary to encroach on those relationships by giving parental rights to former live-in 
male partners. Heatzig v. MacLean, 664 S.E.2d 347, 351 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). As the Principles 
recognize, legal parents exhibit “maximum commitment to the parenting enterprise.” PRINCIPLES ch. 
1, topic 1, intro. note (I)d, at 5. 
 37.  Haleigh’s biological father’s parental rights had been terminated, as had the rights of her 
biological mother upon Haleigh’s adoption. See Transcript of Hearing, supra note 7, at 5, 7, 12-13. 
 38. PRINCIPLES § 2.03 reporter’s notes cmt. b, at 141 (discussing the use of equitable 
doctrines to give parental rights to live-in partners). The Principles define legal parents as biological 
and adoptive parents. Id. cmt. a, at 140. 
 39. See infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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divorce live with their mothers.40 Indeed, among divorced and separated 
couples with children, mothers maintain over five times as many 
households as fathers.41 
This Article argues that in cases in which a mother lives with a 
heterosexual man who is not her child’s legal father, the ALI’s thinned-
out test for parenthood overrides the judgment of mothers42 without 
sufficient consideration for the risks to children.43 It first demonstrates 
that the existence of a loving relationship, so important to denying 
Jason’s claim, is precisely the kind of qualitative test that the drafters of 
the Principles expressly rejected in favor of a more easily administrable 
test based on chores and time.44 It then marshals significant social 
science evidence showing that naïve assumptions about human goodness 
undergird the drafters’ recommendations. This evidence shows that the 
performance of “caretaking” chores, central to the ALI’s test, will do 
little to discern how protective live-in partners have been, or will be.45 
Moreover, countless studies document that unrelated rules are 
significantly over-represented among the population of child sexual 
abusers, as well as those who commit child physical abuse. While it is 
                                                          
 40. Of the children who live with either their mother or father, 87% live with the mother. U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2009, at tbl.C3, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2009.html (follow “Excel” hyperlink). 
Minority women may have their parental prerogatives overridden more often than white women. See 
Sarah H. Ramsey, Constructing Parenthood for Stepparents: Parents by Estoppel and De Facto 
Parents Under the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 285, 287 (2001). 
 41. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 40, at tbl.C3. 
 42. Of course, where legal fathers are raising children, thinned-out notions of parenthood also 
encroach on the father’s prerogative to decide who continues to have contact with his children. 
While this encroachment does not raise all the child protection risks described in Part III, it does 
assume a fortiori that children will be made better off by continuing contact without inquiring into 
whether continuing contact serves a child’s best interests or why a child’s father chose not to 
voluntarily permit contact. See infra Part II. 
 43. At the outset, it is important to recognize that the Principles are invoked not only in cases 
brought by former step-parents and boyfriends, but also by same-sex partners, grandparents, or other 
relatives seeking visitation or custody. All of these cases grapple with the basic mechanics of the 
ALI’s test, with many evincing deep skepticism. See infra Part IV. 
 44. See infra Part II. 
 45. See infra Part III. Gay and lesbian co-parents and female co-residents, such as step-
mothers and girlfriends, are not addressed here since their claims for access to children do not raise 
the same child protection concerns. For example, unlike male live-in partners, we know very little 
about child sexual abuse by women who are unrelated to a child by biology or adoption, other than 
that it seems to occur very rarely. Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Cradle of Abuse: Evaluating the 
Danger Posed By a Sexually Predatory Parent to the Victim’s Siblings, 51 EMORY L.J. 241, 245 & 
n.13 (2002); see infra note 147 and accompanying text. Nor does this critique extend to adoptive 
parents since they are legal parents and, as such, are entitled to all the prerogatives of legal parents 
because they have committed to children in this very important way. Instead, this critique focuses 
exclusively on heterosexual male live-in partners. See infra Part III. 
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certainly true that not every former live-in male partner poses a risk to 
children,46 the ALI’s formulaic proposal to grant parental rights to 
former live-in partners leaves judges little discretion to separate the good 
risks from the bad. 
This Article then surveys how courts in the United States have 
received the ALI’s recommendations about de facto parents.47 While 
courts have looked to the Principles for guidance on this topic more than 
any other, they have rejected the ALI’s approach twice as often as they 
have accepted it. Even courts that have embraced the idea of parental 
rights for live-in partners have beefed up the ALI’s bare-bones test for de 
facto parenthood precisely to safeguard a child’s welfare and the legal 
parent’s ability to have the last word on who has access to her children.48 
These courts overwhelmingly have refused to grant full parental rights 
on such narrow grounds.49 Ultimately, this Article concludes that when 
society takes love and parental judgments into account and not mere 
time-in-residence doing chores for a child, we can be more confident that 
the upside of conferring parental rights on male live-in partners will be 
significant for children, and that the inherent risks of such an approach 
will be greatly reduced. 
II. THE ALI’S THINNED-OUT CONCEPTION OF PARENTHOOD 
Considered the most prestigious law reform organization in the 
United States, the ALI published its long-awaited Principles, an 1183-
page volume, in 2002 after eleven years of work and four successive 
drafts.50 The ALI’s Restatements of the Law and other publications have 
profoundly shaped the evolution of American law.51 Given the ALI’s 
considerable influence, the Principles seemed to hold the promise of a 
significant effect on many of the important and controversial questions 
raised by changes in family forms, both within the United States and 
outside it.52 
While courts have indeed looked to the Principles for guidance on a 
range of matters, from alimony and property division to child support 
                                                          
 46. It is equally true that not every biological parent acts protectively towards children. See 
Wilson, supra note 45, at 290-91. 
 47. See infra Part IV. 
 48. See infra Part V.C. 
 49. See infra Part V. 
 50. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Introduction to RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 1, at 1, 1-
2. 
 51. Marygold S. Melli, The American Law Institute Principles of Family Dissolution, the 
Approximation Rule and Shared-Parenting, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 347, 347-48 (2005). 
 52. Wilson, supra note 50, at 1-3, 5. 
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and domestic partnerships,53 they have gravitated to the Principles for 
guidance on one topic more than any other: the proposal to confer 
parental “rights” on live-in partners of a child’s legal parent.54 In the 
Principles, the drafters propose a three-prong test for determining 
whether a former live-in partner is a de facto parent entitled to a share of 
custody and other parental rights.55 This test requires residency, 
caretaking, and agreement by the child’s legal parent (almost always the 
child’s mother).56 
The first prong, residency, is satisfied when a legal parent’s partner 
lives with the child and the legal parent for as little as two years.57 The 
second prong, caretaking, requires that the partner perform at least half 
of the caretaking functions for the child. Section 2.03(5) defines 
“caretaking functions” as “tasks that involve interaction with the child or 
that direct, arrange, and supervise the interaction and care provided by 
others.”58 These functions include: grooming, washing, dressing, toilet 
training, playing with child, bedtime and wake-up, satisfying nutrition 
needs, protecting child’s safety, providing transportation, directing 
development, discipline, arranging for education, helping to develop 
relations, arranging for health care, providing moral guidance, and 
arranging alternate care for the child.59 The third prong, agreement, is 
met when the child’s legal parent agrees to allow the partner to perform 
an equal share of the child’s caretaking.60 Because agreement may be 
implied, this prong is satisfied when a mother acquiesces to the partner’s 
behavior—behavior that virtually any mother would welcome in her 
partner, such as taking the child to the doctor, reading to the child, 
helping the child get ready for bed, and making dinner for the family.61 
                                                          
 53. See Clisham & Wilson, supra note 1, at 596, 600, 612 (reporting that across all chapters of 
the Principles, courts reject the ALI’s recommendations one-and-a-half times as often as they accept 
them, but that the overwhelming use of the Principles is to reach a result the court would have 
reached otherwise under its own statutes or precedent). 
 54. See infra Part IV (reporting results of a new empirical analysis of the Principles’ impact in 
cases in which live-in partners and other third parties seek parental rights). 
 55. See PRINCIPLES § 2.03(c), at 118. The Principles borrow the term “de facto parent” from 
case law, but significantly enlarge the rights conferred. See infra note 89 and accompanying text 
(discussing work by Professor Jane Murphy). 
 56. PRINCIPLES § 2.03 cmt. c, at 130-34. 
 57. See id. cmt. c(i), at 130-31. The drafters seem unwilling to require additional years or to 
give clear signals that such additional amounts of time should be required. Instead they note that 
“[i]n some cases, a period longer than two years may be required.” See id. cmt. c(iv), at 134 
(emphasis added). The Principles also exclude caretakers who are motivated by financial gain rather 
than “love and loyalty.” Id. cmt. c(ii), at 131-32. 
 58. Id. § 2.03(5), at 118. 
 59. Id. § 2.03(5)(a)–(h), at 118-19 (setting forth a non-exclusive list). 
 60. Id. cmt. c, at 130. 
 61. See id. cmt. c(iii) & illus. 22, at 130, 133. 
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Under the ALI Principles, de facto parents receive standing to press 
a claim unilaterally.62 Once recognized as a de facto parent, the live-in 
partner receives a share of time with the child after the adults’ break-up 
that is proportional to the “caretaking” performed.63 This test for 
custody, known as the approximation standard, functions as a time-
in/time-out test.64 Thus, a person who performs half of the caretaking 
duties for a child is presumptively entitled to as much as half of the time 
with the child after the adult union dissolves.65 Because the de facto 
parent receives the same physical custody rights as the legal parent, this 
would normally encompass overnight stays and unsupervised weekends, 
even over the objection of the mother.66 Finally, the de facto parent may 
become the legal decision-maker for the child in certain instances, just as 
Jason sought to do for Haleigh.67 
                                                          
 62. Id. § 2.04(1)(c), at 147. 
 63. See id. § 2.08(1), at 197-98 (stating that “the proportion of custodial time the child spends 
with each parent approximates the proportion of time each parent spent performing caretaking 
functions for the child prior to the parents’ separation,” unless an exception applies). Prior to the 
Principles’ adoption, the approximation standard had never been adopted by any U.S. jurisdiction. 
See Patrick Parkinson, The Past Caretaking Standard in Comparative Perspective, in 
RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 1, at 446, 448-54 (“[The] Principles advocate a radical new 
approach to determining parenting arrangements after separation.”); Mark Hansen, A Family Law 
Fight: ALI Report Stirs Hot Debate Over Rights of Unmarried Couples, A.B.A.J., June 2003, at 20, 
20, 23. 
 64. See PRINCIPLES § 2.08(1), at 197-99. 
 65. See id.  
 66. Supervised visits are reserved for those instances when protecting the child or the child’s 
parent is warranted, for example when the court finds “credible evidence of domestic violence.” Id. 
§ 2.05, illus. 2, at 163-64. “Credible information” about abuse may also trigger supervision: 
(1) If either . . . parent[] so requests, or upon receipt of credible information that such 
conduct has occurred, the court should determine promptly whether a parent who would 
otherwise be allocated responsibility under a parenting plan has done any of the 
following: 
(a) abused, neglected, or abandoned a child . . . ; 
(b) inflicted domestic violence, or allowed another to inflict domestic violence . . .  
. . . .  
(2) If a parent is found to have engaged in any activity specified [above], . . . the court 
should impose limits that are reasonably calculated to protect the child . . . . The 
limitations available to the court . . . include . . . :  
(a) an adjustment, including a reduction or the elimination, of the custodial 
responsibility of a parent;  
(b) supervision of the custodial time between a parent and the child; 
. . .  
(f) denial of overnight custodial responsibility;  
. . . .  
Id. § 2.11(1)–(2), at 284-85. 
 67. A de facto parent may be made the legal decision-maker for a child but is not 
presumptively entitled to have this role. See id. § 2.09(2) cmt. a, at 264-65 (“Decisionmaking 
responsibility may be allocated to one parent alone, or to two parents jointly. A de facto parent may 
be allocated decisionmaking responsibility.”); id. § 2.09(2), at 264 (giving both legal parents and 
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The drafters of the Principles include some important limits on the 
rights de facto parents would receive. The de facto parent cannot receive 
a majority of the time with a child unless there is a grossly 
disproportionate attachment to the de facto parent over the mother.68 The 
share of time allotted to the de facto parent after the break-up can be 
diminished in cases where giving the de facto parent half or more of the 
time with the child is unworkable, such as when the Principles would 
recognize five or six different adults as entitled to share time with the 
child.69  
Further, the drafters include one key limit on the obligations of de 
facto parents. Unlike every other category of parent acknowledged in the 
Principles, de facto parents do not have to pay child support for the child 
for whom they are receiving parental rights.70 As Professor Katharine 
Baker has observed, “the Principles’ expansion of the custody and 
visitation rights of nontraditional parents, which expands the state’s role 
in child rearing, is not accompanied by greater state responsibility for 
children.”71 This is remarkable because “[t]raditionally, whoever had 
                                                          
parents by estoppel, but not de facto parents, a presumption of joint decision-making responsibility); 
id. § 2.18(1), at 434 (“The court should allocate responsibility to a legal parent, a parent by estoppel, 
or a de facto parent as defined in § 2.03, in accordance with the same standards set forth in §§ 2.08 
through 2.12 . . . .”). 
 68.  
De facto parents. This section gives priority to a legal parent and a parent by estoppel 
over a de facto parent . . . . [A]n allocation of the majority of custodial responsibility to a 
de facto parent is ordinarily precluded when there is a legal parent or a parent by estoppel 
who is fit and willing to care for the child. A de facto parent may still obtain an 
allocation of custodial or decisionmaking responsibility, under the criteria set forth in 
§§ 2.08 through 2.12. 
See id. § 2.18 cmt. b, at 435. The sections of this Chapter afford priority to a legal parent and a 
parent by estoppel in other ways. See, e.g., id. § 2.08(1)(a), at 197-98. (legal parents and parents by 
estoppel, but not de facto parents, entitled to presumptive allocation of custodial responsibility); id. 
§ 2.09(4), at 264 (legal parents and parents by estoppel, but not de facto parents, have presumptive 
access to school and health records of the child). 
 69. See David D. Meyer, Partners, Care Givers, and the Constitutional Substance of 
Parenthood, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 1, at 47, 51. 
 70. See Katharine K. Baker, Asymmetric Parenthood, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra 
note 1, at 121, 133. This choice is perplexing since live-in partners benefit children by providing 
them with additional financial support during the intact adult relationship and presumably could do 
so to some degree afterwards. See Sarah H. Ramsey, Stepparents and the Law: A Nebulous Status 
and a Need for Reform, in STEPPARENTING: ISSUES IN THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 217, 218 
(Kay Pasley & Marilyn Ihinger-Tallman eds., 1994). The decision to give live-in partners parental 
rights without requiring child support may also represent a missed child-protection opportunity. The 
drafters could have limited standing to seek rights as a de facto parent to those adults who assume a 
child support obligation to a child, which would serve an important screening function. It would 
promote continuing contact between children and those adults who have committed to a child in 
concrete, palpable ways—where continuing contact is likely to create the greatest gains for a 
child—while helping to screen out “bad risks.” See infra Part III. 
 71. Baker, supra note 70, at 122. 
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rights had responsibilities and only the people who had rights and 
responsibilities were parents. The Principles now suggest a very 
different structure. People can now have rights without having 
responsibilities, and a determination of legal parentage really only 
matters for the imposition of responsibility.”72 
In many ways, the ALI’s proposed reforms are admirable. The 
Principles seek to provide children with enduring contact with the “only 
father [a] child ha[d] known,”73 a former live-in partner.74 The drafters 
believe that maintaining this relationship is “critically important to the 
child’s welfare.”75 Further, disregarding this relationship after the break-
up “ignores child-parent relationships that may be fundamental to the 
child’s sense of stability.”76 In short, the drafters assume that continuing 
contact will nearly always be an unadulterated good because the 
“division of past caretaking functions correlates well with other factors 
associated with the child’s best interests.”77 
The beneficial effects posited by the drafters come at a price, 
however: limiting the parenting prerogatives of legal parents. As is the 
case with any right, handing out new parental rights is a zero-sum game: 
where a right is enlarged for one party, it is diminished for the other. 
Historically, courts have made custody determinations using the 
“best-interests-of-the-child” standard.78 Doctrines of standing precluded 
                                                          
 72. Id. at 127 (footnote omitted). 
 73. See PRINCIPLES § 2.03 reporter’s notes cmt. b, at 142 (discussing equitable-parent cases). 
 74. Although this Article critiques the use of the Principles’ test to confer parental rights on 
heterosexual male live-in partners, that test would be equally available to heterosexual and same-sex 
partners. As explained above, the child-protection concerns articulated in this Article do not extend 
to gay and lesbian co-parents or female co-residents. See supra note 45. 
 75. PRINCIPLES ch. 1, topic 1, intro. note I(d), at 6. 
 76. Id. at 5. 
 77. Id. § 2.08 cmt. b, at 201. The presumption that residential time with the child should 
approximate past caretaking may be overcome in instances where it is necessary “to avoid 
substantial and almost certain harm to the child.” Id. § 2.08(1)(h), at 197-99. 
[T]he court should allocate custodial responsibility so that the proportion of custodial 
time the child spends with each parent approximates the proportion of time each parent 
spent performing caretaking functions for the child prior to the parents’ separation 
or . . . before the filing of the action, except to the extent required . . . to achieve . . . the 
following objectives: 
. . . .  
(h) to avoid substantial and almost certain harm to the child. 
Id. § 2.08(1); see id. § 2.09(2), at 264 (“The court should presume that an allocation of 
decisionmaking responsibility . . . is in the child’s best interests. The presumption is overcome if 
there is a history of domestic violence or child abuse . . . .”). 
 78. See id. § 2.02 cmt. c, at 105. 
To apply the test, courts must often choose between specific values and views about 
childrearing. . . . When the only guidance for the court is what best serves the child’s 
interests, the court must rely on its own value judgments, or upon experts who have their 
own theories of what is good for children and what is effective parenting. 
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unrelated parties from seeking custody,79 giving parents exclusive say in 
caretaking matters, at least when abuse and neglect were not present.80 In 
jurisdictions that follow the ALI’s approach, however, mothers will wind 
up with less discretion in their parenting choices for two reasons. De 
facto parents can press claims, something many could not have done in 
the absence of the Principles.81 De facto parents are also placed on par 
with legal parents for a share of physical custody that approximates their 
prior relationship with the child.82 By definition, this is presumptively 
half of the time with the child.83 And while rights generally come with 
obligations, the child receives no financial support in exchange for this 
encroachment on the relationship with her mother.84 This is so because 
under the ALI’s test, as noted earlier, a “[f]unctional relationship does 
not give rise to obligation.”85 
                                                          
  The indeterminacy of the best-interests test makes it often difficult for parents to 
predict the outcome of a case. 
Id. 
 79. See id. § 2.04 reporter’s notes cmt. d, at 154 (noting the “traditional rule . . . that a 
nonparent cannot file an action for custody or visitation without a showing that the parents are unfit 
or unavailable”). 
 80. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for 
Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, reprinted in DOUGLAS E. 
ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 168, 
168-69 (4th ed. 2010). 
 81. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text (discussing standing). Very few 
jurisdictions have permitted unmarried cohabitants to initiate actions for custody or visitation. See, 
e.g., Engel v. Kenner, 926 S.W.2d 472, 473, 475 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (denying joint custody to 
boyfriend of mother who lived with mother and child for five months and helped support child for 
three years thereafter); Cooper v. Merkel, 470 N.W.2d 253, 254, 256 (S.D. 1991) (denying visitation 
to mother’s ex-boyfriend who, as a father-figure, had assumed responsibility for raising mother’s 
son for seven years); see also infra app. D, category 7, at 1187-88 (summarizing White v. White and 
Smith v. Gordon). 
 82. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
 83. A presumption of half of the time arises because to qualify as a de facto parent, the 
individual must have performed the majority of the caretaking functions, or at least performed a 
share equal to or greater than the share performed by the legal parent. PRINCIPLES § 2.03 cmt. c, at 
130. Because the approximation standard seeks to mirror the previous caretaking arrangement for 
the child, the de facto parent presumptively would receive at least half of the time with the child. See 
supra note 64-65. 
 84. See Baker, supra note 70, at 133; infra Part III (discussing studies showing that sole 
custody with child’s mother may be more protective of children than custody split between a mother 
and her former live-in partner). 
 85. Baker, supra note 70, at 122; see supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. 
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Like all custody rules,86 the rights conferred by the Principles 
would only come into play when a child’s mother does not willingly 
grant visitation to her ex-partner.87 A mother can always decide 
voluntarily to provide visitation to those men she thinks will enrich her 
child’s life. Importantly, the Principles make no inquiry into why 
mothers do not voluntarily allow former live-in partners to have access 
to their children. Neither do the Principles inquire into how a child will 
fare as a result of continuing contact or as a result of losing contact with 
a live-in partner. Instead, the drafters blindly assume that the loss of 
contact will negatively affect a child. 
The ALI’s treatment of live-in partners unabashedly seeks to both 
standardize custody decisions by tamping down judicial discretion88 and 
to open courtrooms to claims that live-in partners would not have been 
permitted to press in the past.89 The ALI can propose such drastic 
changes because its recommendations in the Principles are directed at 
legislators, who have the option to write on a blank slate, as opposed to 
judges who generally must heed precedent.90 
                                                          
 86. Of course, the influence of a custody rule extends beyond those instances in which the 
legal parent opposes parental rights for her ex-partner in a legal proceeding. By conferring standing 
and “rights” on live-in partners to seek custody and visitation, the drafters make it all the more 
difficult for mothers to say no, even when the matter stays out of court. See Robert H. Mnookin & 
Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 
968 (1979). 
 87. PRINCIPLES § 2.03 reporter’s notes cmt. b, at 141 (discussing custody and visitation rights 
“over the opposition of the legal parent”). 
 88. Id. § 2.02(1)(f), at 104 (describing the primary objective of Chapter 2 as “expeditious, 
predictable decisionmaking and the avoidance of prolonged uncertainty respecting arrangements for 
the child’s care and control”) (emphasis added); see also id. § 2.02, cmt. c, at 106 (“The question for 
rule-makers is not whether the law in this area should require determinacy or permit unbridled 
judicial discretion. It is, rather, what blend of determinacy and discretion produces the best 
combination of predictable and acceptable results, and what substantive values are most 
appropriately reflected in the mix. This Chapter attempts to achieve this equilibrium through 
structured decisionmaking criteria that limit judicial discretion and at the same time express widely 
held societal commitments to children and to family diversity.” (emphasis added)). 
 89. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying test (discussing traditional rules precluding 
standing by live-in partners). While a live-in partner might receive some limited visitation with the 
child after the break-up in certain jurisdictions, this limited entitlement does not approach the 
significant allocations of time and decision-making rights that the Principles would confer on de 
facto parents. See Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support 
Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325, 342-43 & n.78 (2005) (noting 
in a review of de facto parent cases that a “few states and a number of courts have granted 
nonbiological, nonmarital caretakers such as stepfathers . . . rights similar to those granted to legal 
fathers,” but that “these cases generally limit the parental rights to visitation” (footnotes omitted)); 
infra app. D, categories 2-7, at 1180-88. 
 90. Unlike the ALI’s Restatements of the Law, which have been directed mainly at individual 
“decision-makers” (courts), the Principles were directed largely to “rule-makers” (state legislatures). 
Ira Mark Ellman, Chief Reporter’s Foreword, in PRINCIPLES, at xv-xvi (noting that some sections of 
the Principles “are addressed to rulemakers rather than decisionmakers”). This focus was deliberate 
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In sum, the Principles, if enacted or followed, would not allow 
mothers to exercise their judgment about who should see their children. 
The drafters presume that courts guided by the Principles—rather than 
the child’s own mother—can best evaluate when continued contact with 
a live-in partner is in the best interests of a child and when it is not. As a 
matter of sound policy, it would seem that a convincing case must be 
made that children in general are better off before society would remove 
them from the exclusive custody of their mothers and place shared 
responsibility for their well-being in the hands of former live-in male 
partners. The next Part evaluates how well the Principles fare by this 
yardstick. 
III. EVALUATING THE ALI’S PROPOSED REFORMS 
The drafters of the Principles assume that “[b]ecause caretaking 
functions involve tasks relating directly to a child’s care and upbringing, 
[these tasks] . . . are likely to have a special bearing on the strength and 
quality of the adult’s relationship with the child.”91 While courts utilize 
the ALI’s test for de facto parent status in same-sex partner cases,92 the 
child-protection critique offered here is limited only to heterosexual 
male live-in partners. In their zealousness to provide continuing contact 
with good father-figures, however, the drafters offer an easily 
administrable caretaking test that fails to screen out even the worst risks 
to children. As this Part explains, the ALI’s test rewards behavior that 
may portend significant risk to children, is likely to increase the risk of 
sexual or physical abuse for some children, and does so without assuring 
that the children in whom parental rights are given will, as a group, 
benefit from significant financial or other support as a result of the 
continuing contact.  
A. Rewarding Behavior that May Signal Risk 
The drafters posit that caretaking tasks reflect a loving and bonded 
relationship. But those same activities can also indicate a very different 
type of relationship. As Figure 1 illustrates, child molesters “groom” 
their victims to gain the child’s confidence by engaging in conduct that 
most people would see as innocent and perhaps even heartwarming. 
Child molesters read to children, they bathe children, they shower 
                                                          
because much of what the Principles contemplate would require legislative action to make them a 
reality. Press Release, Michael Greenwald, American Law Institute Publishes Principles of the Law 
of Family Dissolution (May 15, 2002), http://www.ali.org/ali/pr051502.htm. 
 91. PRINCIPLES § 2.03 cmt. g, at 137. 
 92. See infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text. 
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children with attention. Indeed, intensive caretaking creates the 
conditions—time alone, unusual dependence, and the child’s acceptance 
of intimate physical touch—that allow and encourage the child’s 
tolerance of later sexual contact.93 Not only does the ALI’s caretaking 
test fail to screen out men likely to pose a risk to children, it actually 
gives those men a “gold star” for behaviors that should raise significant 
caution flags. Thus, the ALI’s assumption that caretaking can only be a 
good operates as a classic one-sided coin and never allows for the 
possibility that caretaking may be the means to bad ends. 
 
Figure 1: Molestation or Legitimate Caretaking? 
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It should surprise no one that predatory men and bad risks like 
Jason Strickland would capitalize on the possibility of parental rights or 
continuing contact with a child. Child molesters and others with bad 
intentions do not just gravitate to single mother households, they hone in 
                                                          
 93. John R. Christiansen & Reed H. Blake, The Grooming Process in Father-Daughter Incest, 
in THE INCEST PERPETRATOR: A FAMILY MEMBER NO ONE WANTS TO TREAT 88, 89, 91-92 (Anne 
L. Horton et al. eds., 1990) (noting that acts of child sexual abuse within the home overwhelmingly 
use coercion and not outright force, and that offenders within the home use “boundary violations”—
bathing, dressing, and bathroom behavior—to “groom” children to participate in sexual activities). 
 94. DAVID FINKELHOR, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: NEW THEORY AND RESEARCH 93 (1984); 
Christiansen & Blake, supra note 93, at 89, 91-92; Jon R. Conte et al., What Sexual Offenders Tell 
Us About Prevention Strategies, 13 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 293, 300 (1989). 
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on them. In a study of child predators conducted by Jon Conte, one child 
molester succinctly described his modus operandi this way: find “[s]ome 
way to get a child living with you.”95 Anna Salter’s interviews of sex 
offenders include a particularly chilling account by a sex offender who 
deliberately dated women in order to rape their children.96 
These men are not alone in this approach. Asked about victim 
selection, fifteen of seventy-two incarcerated child molesters indicated 
that they deliberately targeted “passive, quiet, troubled, lonely children 
from broken homes” since these characteristics indicate a child’s 
vulnerability to their advances.97 As one child molester explained, by 
selecting a child “who doesn’t have a happy home life,” it is “easier to 
groom them and to gain their confidence.”98 
B. Increasing the Risk of Child Sexual Abuse 
The ALI’s test for awarding parental rights to live-in partners is 
flawed for another reason. It fails to consider the risks to children that 
flow from significantly enlarging the parental rights of former male live-
in partners. Children who spend time with unrelated males are placed at 
a significantly higher risk of physical and sexual abuse, as this section 
and the next document.99 
                                                          
 95. Conte et al., supra note 94, at 298. 
 96. Videotape: Truth, Lies, and Sex Offenders (Anna C. Salter 1996) (on file with the Sage 
College Library). 
 97. Lee Eric Budin & Charles Felzen Johnson, Sex Abuse Prevention Programs: Offenders’ 
Attitudes About Their Efficacy, 13 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 77, 79, 84 (1989). Similarly, one study 
of twenty adult sexual offenders in a Seattle, Washington treatment program found that offenders 
selected victims based on the child’s vulnerability, with vulnerability “defined both in terms of 
children’s status (e.g., living in a divorced home or being young) and in terms of emotional or 
psychological state (e.g., a needy child, a depressed or unhappy child).” Conte et al., supra note 94, 
at 293, 299. 
 98. Conte et al., supra note 94, at 298. For those children who have experienced divorce, the 
emotional void created by the loss of a parent sometimes opens the child up to the abuser’s 
predations, making them less able to say “no” to unwanted sexual advances.  Lucy Berliner & Jon R. 
Conte, The Process of Victimization: The Victims’ Perspective, 14 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 29, 35 
(1990) (“In many cases the sexual abuse relationship filled a significant deficit in the child’s 
life . . . . The children were troubled and/or their parents were not resources for them.”). Berliner 
and Conte suggest that offenders exploited “a child’s normal need to feel loved, valued, and cared 
for.” Id. at 38; see Conte et al., supra note 94, at 299 (describing ways in which sexual predators 
“manipulate . . . [a child’s] vulnerability as a means of gaining sexual access”). 
 99. ANDREA J. SEDLAK ET AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOURTH NATIONAL 
INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (NIS-4): REPORT TO CONGRESS 5–20 to 5–22 
(2010) (finding that children living with parent’s cohabiting partner had the highest rate of abuse 
under the Harm Standard at 33.6 children being abused per 1000, compared to only 2.9 for children 
living with two married biological parents; that the rate of sexual abuse for such children was nearly 
twenty times the rate for children living with married biological parents at 9.9 and 0.5 children per 
1000, respectively; and the rate of physical abuse under the Harm Standard was ten times greater at 
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Incest and molestation occur with much greater frequency when 
mothers are not present.100 For example, a study by Jillian Fleming and 
colleagues found that: “For women abused by someone outside of the 
family, the significant predictors [included the] . . . mother’s death[] and 
having an alcoholic mother.”101 The mere absence of a girl’s mother 
                                                          
19.6 and 1.9 children per 1000, respectively); see notes 110-24 and accompanying text. 
 100. The only national survey in the United States to examine risk factors for child sexual 
assault at the time found higher rates of abuse among women who reported living for some period of 
time without one of their biological parents. David Finkelhor et al., Sexual Abuse in a National 
Survey of Adult Men and Women: Prevalence, Characteristics, and Risk Factors, 14 CHILD ABUSE 
& NEGLECT 19, 20, 24-25 (1990) (finding in a national survey of 2626 adult men and women that 
separation from a natural parent for a major portion of one’s childhood is a risk factor for sexual 
victimization). 
  This phenomenon is widely acknowledged by child abuse researchers. See, e.g., 
CHRISTOPHER BAGLEY & KATHLEEN KING, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: THE SEARCH FOR HEALING 90 
(1990) (“It is not typical for sexual abuse to occur independently of other aspects of family 
dysfunction. It occurs with greater frequency in homes disrupted by parental absence or 
separation . . . .”); Christopher Bagley & Richard Ramsay, Sexual Abuse in Childhood: 
Psychosocial Outcomes and Implications for Social Work Practice, in SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE IN 
SEXUAL PROBLEMS 33, 37, 42 (James Gripton & Mary Valentich eds., 1986) (stating that 
molestation “occurs with greater frequency in homes which are disrupted by the child’s separation 
from one or both parents,” but cautioning that “sexual abuse is not[,] in statistical terms, a direct 
function of family variables”); Ann W. Burgess et al., Abused to Abuser: Antecedents of Socially 
Deviant Behaviors, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1431, 1432-33 (1987) (finding, in follow-up studies of 
two groups of adolescents who participated in sex rings as children, that 70% of adolescents who 
participated in the sex rings for more than one year were from single-parent families, compared to 
47% of the adolescents who were involved for less than a year); David M. Fergusson et al., 
Childhood Sexual Abuse, Adolescent Sexual Behaviors and Sexual Revictimization, 21 CHILD 
ABUSE & NEGLECT 789, 797 (1997) (finding, in a longitudinal study of 520 New Zealand-born 
children, that “[y]oung women who reported . . . [child sexual abuse] were more likely [than non-
abused children] to have experienced at least one change of parents before the age of [fifteen]”); 
David Finkelhor, Current Information on the Scope and Nature of Child Sexual Abuse, FUTURE OF 
CHILD., Summer/Fall 1994, at 31, 48 [hereinafter Finkelhor, Current Information] (“In many 
studies . . . children who lived for extended periods of time apart from one parent have been found 
to bear elevated risks for sexual abuse.”); David Finkelhor, Epidemiological Factors in the Clinical 
Identification of Child Sexual Abuse, 17 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 67, 68 (1993) [hereinafter 
Finkelhor, Epidemiological Factors] (“In general, children who are living without one or both of 
their natural parents are at greater risk for abuse.”); Jean Giles-Sims, Current Knowledge About 
Child Abuse in Stepfamilies, 26 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 215, 218 (1997) (“[S]exual abuse literature 
is more consistent . . . in finding that children not living with both natural parents run higher risks of 
child sexual abuse both from family members and others, but the exact magnitude of reported risk 
varies across studies.”); Hilda Parker & Seymour Parker, Father-Daughter Sexual Abuse: An 
Emerging Perspective, 56 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 531, 532 (1986) (“Reconstituted families, 
stepparent[,] and broken families, with mother’s male companions in the home, seem to be 
vulnerable.”); Anne E. Stern et al., Self Esteem, Depression, Behaviour and Family Functioning in 
Sexually Abused Children, 36 J. CHILD. PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 1077, 1080, 1081 tbl.1 (1995) 
(finding, in a comparison of eighty-four sexually abused children and their families to a non-abused 
control group, that the abused group had more marital breakdown and change of parents than the 
non-abused group). 
 101. Jillian Fleming et al., A Study of Potential Risk Factors for Sexual Abuse in Childhood, 21 
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 49, 50, 53, 55 (1997) (enumerating factors possibly associated with 
childhood sexual abuse, including “living apart from their mother at some time during their 
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heightens her risk for sexual exploitation.102 Researchers have compared 
girls who lived without their mother before the age of sixteen to those 
who remained with their mother throughout childhood.103 The sexual 
vulnerability of the estranged girls was nearly two hundred percent 
greater than that of other girls, leading one researcher to conclude that 
“missing a mother is the most damaging kind of disruption.”104 
This pattern of a girl’s heightened vulnerability in mother-absent 
households is repeated in multiple studies of children living without one 
biological parent.105 In one of the few longitudinal studies of a general 
                                                          
childhood”). The authors speculate that a birth mother’s absence, in the form of her death or mental 
illness, “may place the child at risk of neglect that involves a lack of supervision.” Id. at 56. 
 102. DAVID FINKELHOR, SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILDREN 121, 125 (1979). 
 103. Id. at 120-21. 
 104. Id. at 121. Those studies estimating the incidence of sexual abuse find that as many as half 
the girls in fractured families report sexual abuse as a child. See, e.g., id. at 125 (discovering that 
58% of the girls who, at some time before the age of sixteen, had lived without their mothers had 
been sexually victimized, three times the rate for the whole sample, making these girls “highly 
vulnerable to sexual victimization”); see also Bagley & Ramsay, supra note 100, at 37, 38-39 tbl.1 
(reporting that 53% of women separated from a parent during childhood reported sexual abuse). 
 105. At least a dozen other studies confirm that sexual victimization occurs more often in 
disrupted families. See, e.g., VINCENT DE FRANCIS, PROTECTING THE CHILD VICTIM OF SEX CRIMES 
COMMITTED BY ADULTS: FINAL REPORT 50, 50 tbl.14 (1969) (finding, in a study of 250 sexual 
abuse cases, that in 60% of the families the child’s natural father or natural mother was not in the 
home—“an extraordinarily high incidence of broken homes”); DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, THE SECRET 
TRAUMA: INCEST IN THE LIVES OF GIRLS AND WOMEN 103, 104 tbl.8-1 (1986) (“[W]omen who 
were reared by both of their biological or adoptive parents were the least likely to be incestuously 
abused . . . .”); S. KIRSON WEINBERG, INCEST BEHAVIOR 41, 49 (1955) (finding, in a study of 203 
incest cases in Illinois, that 40.3% of the fathers were widowed or separated from their wives at the 
start of incestuous relationships with their daughters); Rebecca M. Bolen, Predicting Risk to Be 
Sexually Abused: A Comparison of Logistic Regression to Event History Analysis, 3 CHILD 
MALTREATMENT 157, 164 (1998) (finding, in a multivariate analysis of Diana Russell’s survey data 
on 930 adult women in the San Francisco area, that “[r]espondents living with both natural parents 
prior to the age of 14 had the lowest rates of abuse”); David Finkelhor & Larry Baron, High-Risk 
Children, in A SOURCEBOOK ON CHILDREN SEXUAL ABUSE 60, 73, 79 (1986) (noting the 
“impressive number of studies with positive findings on the question of parental absence,” and 
concluding that “[t]he strongest and most consistent associations across the studies concerned the 
parents of abused children,” and that “[g]irls who are victimized are . . . more likely to have lived 
without their natural fathers”); Marcellina Mian et al., Review of 125 Children 6 Years of Age and 
Under Who Were Sexually Abused, 10 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 223, 227 (1986) (finding that 67% 
of the victims of intrafamilial abuse came from families in which parents had separated or divorced, 
compared to 27% of the children abused by perpetrators outside of the family); P.E. Mullen et al., 
The Long-Term Impact of the Physical, Emotional, and Sexual Abuse of Children: A Community 
Study, 20 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 7, 8-9, 18 (1996) (reporting, in a study of 2250 randomly 
selected adult women in New Zealand, that sexual, physical, and emotional abuse “occurred more 
often in those from disturbed and disrupted home backgrounds”); Nancy D. Vogeltanz et al., 
Prevalence and Risk Factors for Childhood Sexual Abuse in Women: National Survey Findings, 23 
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 579, 586 (1999) (finding, after using statistical analysis to unravel the 
effects of multiple risk factors, that not living with both biological parents by the age of sixteen 
ranked among those factors “significantly associated with increased risk of . . . [child sexual 
abuse]”); Patricia Y. Miller, Blaming the Victim of Child Molestation: An Empirical Analysis 
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population, David Fergusson and his colleagues followed 1265 children 
from birth until the age of eighteen.106 They found that 66.5% of the 
victims of sexual abuse came from families that “experience[d] at least 
one change of parents before age 15,” compared to 33.5% of children 
who did not experience abuse.107 Fergusson reported, moreover, that 
60% of children who experienced intercourse as part of the abuse had 
been exposed to parental divorce or separation.108 However, in a 
regression analysis, investigators found that five factors—gender, 
marital conflict, parental attachment, parental overprotection, and 
parental alcoholism—were predictive of reported abuse.109  
 Furthermore, a significant body of research indicates that the 
presence of a step-father or mother’s boyfriend greatly increases the risk 
of sexual molestation for young girls,110 although the risk is not limited 
                                                          
(1976) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University) (on file with the Hofstra Law 
Review) (discovering that a biological father’s absence “directly influence[d] molestation” and 
constituted the “variable [with] the largest direct effect on . . . victimization”); cf. Kristin Anderson 
Moore et al., Nonvoluntary Sexual Activity Among Adolescents, 21 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 110, 113 & 
tbl.3 (1989) (ascertaining in a study of white female adolescents that having parents who are 
“separated, divorced or never-married” doubles the likelihood of sexual abuse, although the 
association was not significant when other factors were controlled). 
 106. David M. Fergusson et al., Childhood Sexual Abuse and Psychiatric Disorder in Young 
Adulthood: I. Prevalence of Sexual Abuse and Factors Associated with Sexual Abuse, 35 J. AM. 
ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1355, 1356 (1996) (following a cohort of children born 
in Christchurch, New Zealand in 1977 and asking them at age eighteen to provide retrospective 
reports of molestation experiences during childhood). 
 107. Id. at 1359 tbl.2. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1360 & tbl.3. 
 110. Obviously, this conclusion is drawn from scientific studies across large groups and says 
nothing about risks posed by any individual step-father or boyfriend. Nonetheless, a child’s 
exposure to unrelated men in her home plays a crucial role in determining her vulnerability to sexual 
victimization. In one long-term study, researchers in New Zealand found that children reporting 
childhood sexual abuse were more likely to live with a step-parent before the age of fifteen. Id. at 
1356, 1359 tbl.2 (reporting results of a longitudinal study of 1265 children who were studied from 
birth until age 18). Of those children experiencing intercourse, nearly half (45.5%) were raised in a 
step-parent household. Id. at 1359 tbl.2. 
  Similarly, Diana Russell found, in a community survey of 930 women in San Francisco, 
that one out of six girls growing up with a step-father was sexually abused, making these girls over 
seven times more likely to be sexually victimized than girls living with both biological parents. 
RUSSELL, supra note 105, at 10, 103 (reporting that 2% of respondents reared by biological fathers 
were sexually abused, while at least 17% of the women in the sample who were reared by a step-
father were sexually abused by him before the age of fourteen); cf. Parker & Parker, supra note 100, 
at 541 (finding risk of abuse associated with step-father status to be almost twice as high as for 
natural fathers). Significantly, the risk of sexual assault by father substitutes “who are around for 
shorter lengths of time . . . may be considerably higher.” RUSSELL, supra note 105, at 268; see also 
Joseph H. Beitchman et al., A Review of the Short-Term Effects of Child Sexual Abuse, 15 CHILD 
ABUSE & NEGLECT 537, 538, 550 (1991) (observing in a review of forty-two separate publications 
that “[t]he majority of children who were sexually abused . . . appeared to have come from single or 
reconstituted families”); Jocelyn Brown et al., A Longitudinal Analysis of Risk Factors for Child 
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only to young girls.111 Consider some representative studies. Leslie 
Margolin and John Craft examined 2372 cases of “founded” sexual 
abuse involving caretakers in Iowa for the identities of the individual 
directly responsible for a child’s sexual abuse.112 Step-fathers accounted 
for 41% of the abusers, almost four times what the researchers expected 
based on the number of children living with step-fathers at that time.113 
In another study, Rebecca Bolen used statistical tools to distinguish the 
effect of living without both natural parents from other aspects of 
                                                          
Maltreatment: Findings of a 17-Year Prospective Study of Officially Recorded and Self-Reported 
Child Abuse and Neglect, 22 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1065, 1067, 1074 (1998) (finding, in a 
longitudinal study of 644 families in upstate New York between 1975 and 1992, that disruption of 
relationships with biological parents and living in the presence of a step-father increased childrens’ 
risk of sexual abuse); Fergusson et al., supra note 100, at 791, 797 (finding, in a longitudinal study 
of 520 New Zealand-born young women, that child sexual abuse was associated with living with a 
step-parent before the age of fifteen); Finkelhor & Baron, supra note 105, at 79 (“The strongest and 
most consistent associations across the studies concerned the parents of abused children. . . . Girls 
who lived with stepfathers were also at increased risk for abuse.”); John M. Leventhal, 
Epidemiology of Sexual Abuse of Children: Old Problems, New Directions, 22 CHILD ABUSE & 
NEGLECT 481, 488 (1998) (“Studies have indicated that . . . girls living with step-fathers are at an 
increased risk compared to girls living with biological fathers . . . .”). 
  In a number of studies, step-fathers actually outnumbered natural fathers as abusers, a 
telling result given the disproportionately greater number of biological fathers during the time of the 
study. DE FRANCIS, supra note 105, at 69 & tbl.26 (finding that the natural father committed the 
offense in 13% of the cases, whereas in 14% of cases the offense was committed by a step-father or 
by the man with whom the child’s mother was living); Jean Giles-Sims & David Finkelhor, Child 
Abuse in Stepfamilies, 33 FAM. REL. 407, 408 tbl.1 (1984) (reporting that 30% of abusers in a study 
were step-fathers, outnumbering natural father abusers, who constituted 28% of the abusers). 
  Christopher Bagley and Kathleen King estimate that “as many as one in four step-fathers 
may sexually abuse the female children to whom they have access.” BAGLEY & KING, supra note 
100, at 75-76. The risk of abuse to girls at the hand of former live-in partners is even greater than 
these comparisons suggest because these girls “are also more likely than other girls to be victimized 
by other men.” FINKELHOR, supra note 94, at 25. For example, step-daughters are five times more 
likely to be abused by a friend of their parents than are girls in traditional nuclear families. Id. Thus, 
step-fathers “are associated with sexual victimization, not just because they themselves take 
advantage of a girl, but because they increase the likelihood of a nonfamily member also doing so.” 
FINKELHOR, supra note 102, at 130; see also BAGLEY & KING, supra note 100, at 91 (citing a study 
which found that girls separated from one parent “were also at risk for sexual victimization by more 
than one adult”). Because the risk of sexual abuse is cumulative, one researcher found that 
“[v]irtually half the girls with stepfathers were victimized by someone.” FINKELHOR, supra note 94, 
at 25. 
  While these studies differ in scope and the strength of their findings, they agree on one 
essential conclusion: the addition of an unrelated male “to a girl’s family causes her vulnerability to 
skyrocket.” FINKELHOR, supra note 102, at 122. 
 111. See Wilson, supra note 1, at 114; Robin Fretwell Wilson, Fractured Families, Fragile 
Children—the Sexual Vulnerability of Girls in the Aftermath of Divorce, 14 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 1, 1 
(2002). 
 112. Leslie Margolin & John L. Craft, Child Sexual Abuse by Caretakers, 38 FAM. REL. 450, 
450 (1989). 
 113. Id. at 452. 
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household composition.114 When all other variables were held constant, 
she found “children living with males in the household after separation 
[of their parents] were more than 7 times more likely to be abused” than 
“children living with only females after separation.”115 In hard numbers, 
“over half of these children were sexually abused.”116 Bolen’s findings 
suggest that the heightened risk to girls does not result from the breakup 
of a traditional nuclear family itself,117 but “[i]nstead, living with a male 
in the household after separation . . . appeared to be the more important 
predictor.”118 
Multiple studies in North America have found over-representation 
of step-fathers and boyfriends among abusers.119 The baseline against 
                                                          
 114. Bolen, supra note 105, at 165-66 & tbl.2 (performing multivariate analyses of data from 
Diana Russell’s survey of 930 adult women in the San Francisco area).  
 115. Id. at 167. 
 116. Id. at 163 & tbl.1 (reporting that 53% were sexually abused). 
 117. Some may see the risks to children in fractured and blended families as a deficit of their 
family form (i.e., whether they have two parents). See id. These statistics would not support such an 
inference—an intact family does not immunize a child from sexual exploitation. See, e.g., Finkelhor, 
Epidemiological Factors, supra note 100, at 68 (“[T]he presence of both natural parents is certainly 
not an indicator of low risk in any absolute sense.”); Mullen et al., supra note 105, at 18 (“Intact 
families do not guarantee stability . . . .”). 
 118. Bolen, supra note 105, at 167. As Bolen observes, “for children living with a male in the 
household, rates of abuse appeared to be better explained by (a) living with a stepfather or (b) being 
separated from one’s natural mother.” Id. at 166. While “the addition of a stepfather to a girl’s 
family causes her vulnerability to skyrocket[,]” FINKELHOR, supra note 102, at 122, it is overly 
simplistic to assume that the mother’s remarriage or cohabitation is a necessary predicate to 
victimization. A girl’s long-term separation from her father—a risk factor “strongly associated” with 
childhood victimization—is sometimes, but not always, followed by the introduction of unrelated 
males into the household. BAGLEY & KING, supra note 100, at 91. 
 119. See, e.g., SEDLAK ET AL., supra note 99, at 5–19 (finding that the incidence of sexual 
abuse for children living with one parent and that parent’s live-in partner was nearly twenty times 
the rate for children living with married biological parents); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., STUDY FINDINGS: NATIONAL STUDY OF THE INCIDENCE AND SEVERITY OF CHILD ABUSE 
AND NEGLECT 6, 31 tbl.5-5 (1981) (finding, in a stratified random sample of child protective 
services agencies in twenty-six counties within ten states, that step-fathers were involved in 30% of 
the reported sexual abuse cases, while biological fathers were involved in 28% of the cases); 
Hendrika B. Cantwell, Sexual Abuse of Children in Denver, 1979: Reviewed with Implications for 
Pediatric Intervention and Possible Prevention, 5 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 75, 77 tbl.1 (1981) 
(finding, in a study of 226 substantiated cases of child sexual abuse in Denver, Colorado during 
1979, that 27.5% of children were sexually victimized by a surrogate father, compared to 26.5% 
who were abused by their natural father); Robert Pierce & Lois Hauck Pierce, The Sexually Abused 
Child: A Comparison of Male and Female Victims, 9 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 191, 192-93, 194 
tbl.2 (1985) (ascertaining from a review of 180 substantiated cases of sexual abuse reported to a 
child abuse hotline between 1976 and 1979 that 41% of the perpetrators against girls were the 
child’s natural father, while 23% were the child’s step-father); Edward Sagarin, Incest: Problems of 
Definition and Frequency, 13 J. SEX RES. 126, 133-34 (1977) (concluding from a study of seventy-
five cases of heterosexual incest involving thirty-two step-fathers and thirty-four biological fathers, 
that “it appears that the likelihood of a stepfather-stepdaughter relationship is far greater than [a] 
father-daughter [relationship]” because the “number of households in which there is a stepfather and 
stepdaughter is surely many times lesser than those in which there is a father and daughter”); cf. 
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which “over-representation” is measured is the “expected” rate of abuse, 
that is, the number or percentage of all households at the time of the 
study that contained step-fathers or boyfriends. A population is over-
represented when the number or percentage of step-father or boyfriend 
abusers exceeds the incidence of households with step-fathers or live-in 
boyfriends. This over-representation appears to be an international 
phenomenon, consistent across cultures.120 A study of child abuse 
registers in the United Kingdom found that 46% of paternal offenders 
were non-birth fathers, compared to 54% who were birth fathers.121 
                                                          
MARY DE YOUNG, THE SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF CHILDREN 16 (1982) (finding, in a study of 
sixty incest victims, that 39% of the incest offenders were step-fathers, leading the author to 
conclude “that the introduction of a stepfather into a family does increase the possibility that the 
stepdaughter will become the victim of incest”); Mark D. Everson et al., Maternal Support 
Following Disclosure of Incest, 59 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 197, 198-99 (1989) (finding, in a 
sample of eighty-eight children recruited from eleven county social service agencies in North 
Carolina over a twenty-eight month period to study the effects of maternal support, that 30% of the 
perpetrators were biological fathers, 41% were step-fathers, and 17% were mothers’ boyfriends); 
Elizabeth A. Sirles & Pamela J. Franke, Factors Influencing Mothers’ Reactions to Intrafamily 
Sexual Abuse, 13 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 131, 132, 133 tbl.1 (1989) (finding, in a maternal 
support study of 193 incest victims receiving counseling services in St. Louis, Missouri, that 64 
children were molested by their father, with an equal number abused by a step-father or a mother’s 
live-in partner). 
 120. See, e.g., Roda Chen, Risk Factors of Sexual Abuse Among College Students in Taiwan, 
11 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 79, 88 (1996) (discovering that those Taiwanese respondents “who 
did not live with both parents before college faced a higher risk [of childhood sexual abuse] than 
those who lived with both parents”); Russell P. Dobash et al., Child Sexual Abusers: Recognition 
and Response, in CHILD ABUSE AND CHILD ABUSERS: PROTECTION AND PREVENTION 113, 114-15, 
124 & fig.6.6 (Lorraine Waterhouse ed., 1993) (finding, in a study of 53 known perpetrators of child 
abuse in Scotland that, 12.59% of child victims lived with their mother and her cohabitant, while 
14.86% lived with their mother and a step-father, leading the authors to conclude that children living 
with step-fathers and unrelated male cohabitees appear to be more at risk of sexual abuse than 
children living with both their natural parents); Michael Gordon & Susan J. Creighton, Natal and 
Non-natal Fathers as Sexual Abusers in the United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis, 50 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 99, 99-101, 104 (1988) (finding, in a review of data collected by the National 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, that step-fathers and father substitutes “were 
disproportionately represented among [perpetrators]”); S. Krugman et al., Sexual Abuse and 
Corporal Punishment During Childhood: A Pilot Retrospective Survey of University Students in 
Costa Rica, 90 PEDIATRICS 157, 157-58 (1992) (finding, in a study of 497 Costa Rican university 
students, that a step-father caused 6.3% of the female abuse experiences, while natural fathers 
caused 3.2%); S.N. Madu & K. Peltzer, Risk Factors and Child Sexual Abuse Among Secondary 
School Students in the Northern Province (South Africa), 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 259, 266 
(2000) (reporting that having a step-parent in the family during childhood significantly predicted 
risk of child sexual abuse); Heikki Sariola & Antti Uutela, The Prevalence and Context of Incest 
Abuse in Finland, 20 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 843, 845 (1996) (reporting that 3.7% of Finnish 
girls living with a step-father reported being sexually abused by him, making step-father/step-
daughter abuse fifteen times more common than father-daughter incest); see also David Finkelhor, 
The International Epidemiology of Child Sexual Abuse, 18 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 409, 412 
(1994) (reviewing international studies of child sexual abuse and debunking the notion that “the 
problem is more severe in North America”). 
 121. Gordon & Creighton, supra note 120, at 99-101. 
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Given the fact that during the study period only 4% of British children 
resided with non-birth fathers, father-substitutes appear “substantially 
overrepresented” among perpetrators.122 As one researcher concluded, “a 
stepfather was five times more likely to sexually victimize his 
stepdaughter than was a . . . [genetic] father.”123 Because studies of child 
sexual abuse routinely report that girls living with step-fathers are at a 
high risk, one researcher concluded that the presence of a step-father is 
“[t]he family feature whose risk has been most dramatically 
demonstrated.”124 
This heightened vulnerability may stem, in part, from a lack of 
supervision, as single and separated parents navigate the taxing process 
of parenting alone and rebuilding their lives.125 Many custodial mothers 
and single mothers work outside the home to support their family, 
diminishing the opportunity to supervise their children.126 As Judith 
Wallerstein has explained: “It’s not that parents love their children less 
or worry less about them [after divorce]. It’s that they are fully engaged 
in rebuilding their own lives—economically, socially and sexually.”127 
                                                          
 122. Id. at 101; see also SUSAN J. CREIGHTON & NEIL RUSSELL, VOICES FROM CHILDHOOD: A 
SURVEY OF CHILDHOOD EXPERIENCES AND ATTITUDES TO CHILD REARING AMONG ADULTS IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 45 tbl.14 (1995) (reporting that 8% of respondents in England, Scotland, and 
Wales were sexually abused by their fathers, while 7% were victimized by a step-father); DAVID 
THORPE, EVALUATING CHILD PROTECTION 1, 115 (1994) (finding, in a study of social service 
referrals in the United Kingdom and western Australia, that parents were responsible for 27.7% of 
the sexual abuse cases; in contrast, step-parents and de facto parents accounted for 24.8% of cases); 
Dobash et al., supra note 120, at 120 (finding, in an analysis of 501 sexual abuse case files taken 
from Scottish police and child protection agencies, that 23% of identified abusers were the child’s 
natural father, while 23% were the victim’s step-father or father substitute); Patricia J. Mrazek et al., 
Sexual Abuse of Children in the United Kingdom, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 147, 148, 150 (1983) 
(noting, in a survey of 1599 family doctors, police surgeons, pediatricians, and child psychiatrists in 
the United Kingdom, that “[w]ithin the family, the natural father was most likely (48%) to be the 
perpetrator, with step-parents the next most common (28%)”). 
 123. David Finkelhor, Risk Factors in the Sexual Victimization of Children, 4 CHILD ABUSE & 
NEGLECT 265, 265, 269 (1980) (reporting results of a study of college undergraduates). 
 124. Finkelhor, Epidemiological Factors, supra note 100, at 68. 
 125. FINKELHOR, supra note 102, at 124 (speculating that the custodial parent’s new 
relationship may take “time and energy and actually mean less supervision of the child”). 
 126. See, e.g., Ross Finnie, Women, Men, and the Economic Consequences of Divorce: 
Evidence from Canadian Longitudinal Data, 30 CANADIAN REV. SOC. & ANTHROPOLOGY 205, 206 
(1993) (reporting that the income-to-needs ratio for women drops just over 40% in the first year of 
divorce, followed by a moderate rise in subsequent years); Saul D. Hoffman & Greg J. Duncan, 
What Are the Economic Consequences of Divorce?, 25 DEMOGRAPHY 641, 644 (1988) (showing a 
decline in economic status of about one-third for women and children after divorce); Richard R. 
Peterson, A Re-Evaluation of the Economic Consequences of Divorce, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 528, 528 
(1996) (noting one study of women in Los Angeles that estimated that women’s standard of living 
declined 73% after divorce). 
 127. JUDITH WALLERSTEIN ET AL., THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: A 25 YEAR 
LANDMARK STUDY, at xxix (2000). 
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Although there is scant research on the risks to girls in father-
custody households,128 the available research underscores the 
significance of a mother’s absence, both temporary and long-term. One 
national survey in the United States found significantly elevated risk of 
molestation for girls following divorce, “particularly when living alone 
with [their] father[s].”129 In that study, 50% of female children residing 
solely with their father reported sexual abuse by someone, although not 
necessarily their father.130 Similarly, a 1995 poll of fathers about child 
maltreatment found an annual rate of child sexual abuse for boys and 
girls in single-father households equal to forty-six victims per thousand 
children.131 By comparison, parents in two-parent households reported a 
rate of eleven victims per thousand children.132 
It is unclear how much weight should be given to the studies of 
mothers’ absence since under the ALI’s proposal, a child’s legal parent 
would be presumptively entitled to half of the custodial responsibility for 
a child. In one sense, the mother remains present because the child 
returns home after visits with the de facto parent. In another sense, 
however, the mother is absent for those periods when the child is in the 
custody of the de facto parent.  
There are good reasons to avoid contexts that permit illicit desires 
to gain ground and manifest themselves. Many abused children never 
disclose the abuse and outwardly display no telltale symptoms.133 In fact, 
                                                          
 128. The absence, until recently, in child sexual abuse studies of “raised by father only” and 
“raised by father and stepmother” categories reflects the historical preference for maternal custody. 
See, e.g., HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 19-4, 
at 797, 799 (2d ed. 1988). 
 129. Finkelhor et al., supra note 100, at 24-25 & tbl.7; see also Giacomo Canepa & Tullio 
Bandini, Incest and Family Dynamics: A Clinical Study, 3 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 453, 459 
(1980) (discussing the recurrence of several factors in nine case histories of father-daughter incest, 
with a step-mother’s presence occurring in two of the nine case histories). 
 130. See Finkelhor et al., supra note 100, at 25 tbl.7. 
 131. See THE GALLUP ORG., DISCIPLINING CHILDREN IN AMERICA: A GALLUP POLL REPORT 
16 (1995) (reporting results of poll of one thousand parents); see also Desmond K. Runyan, 
Prevalence, Risk, Sensitivity, and Specificity: A Commentary on the Epidemiology of Child Sexual 
Abuse and the Development of a Research Agenda, 22 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 493, 495 (1998) 
(“An obvious area of research is to sort out the additional risk of children being victimized in single 
parent households and why the rate is higher in male-headed households.”). 
 132. THE GALLUP ORG., supra note 131, at 16. 
 133. Mian et al. found that the rate of purposeful (as opposed to unintentional) disclosure by 
the child decreased significantly when the perpetrator was intrafamilial. Mian et al., supra note 105, 
at 226 tbl.5 (illustrating that disclosure rates for purposeful abuse decreases significantly for 
children between the ages of five and six). In fact, a greater proportion of children victimized by 
family (17.7%) never tell; by contrast, 10.9% of children who are the victims of extrafamilial abuse 
never disclose. See Donald G. Fischer & Wendy L. McDonald, Characteristics of Intrafamilial and 
Extrafamilial Child Sexual Abuse, 22 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 915, 926 (1998). 
  Physical manifestations one might expect are also frequently absent. One-third of sexually 
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the abuse most likely to remain shrouded in secrecy often occurs at the 
hands of a father-figure,134 even as violations by father-figures are 
among the most depraved.135 
C. Increasing the Risk of Physical Abuse 
Like the risk of sexual abuse, the risk of physical abuse also soars 
when a child lives with an unrelated male. Consider the 2005 study 
published in Pediatrics by Patricia Schnitzer and Bernard Ewigman.136 
The researchers examined the household composition of all children in 
Missouri under the age of five who died between January 1, 1992 and 
December 31, 1999.137 The study compared the household structure for 
children who died due to inflicted injury with those who died by natural 
causes.138 Nearly three-fourths (71.2%) of the perpetrators were male 
and, of those, 34.9% were the child’s father, and 24.2% were the child’s 
mother’s boyfriend.139 Because very few children in Missouri lived with 
their mother’s boyfriend at this time, “[c]hildren living in households 
with an adult unrelated to them were almost 50 times as likely to die of 
an inflicted injury than children living in households with 2 biological 
parents.”140 Significantly, the study did not find elevated risk in 
households in which children lived only with their mothers, suggesting 
that older studies finding elevated risk in single-mother households 
likely captured the actions of men with whom the mothers lived.141 The 
authors concluded that “it is the presence of adults (usually male) in the 
household who are unrelated to the child victim that accounts for the 
                                                          
abused children have no apparent symptoms. Kathleen A. Kendall-Tackett et al., Impact of Sexual 
Abuse on Children: A Review and Synthesis of Recent Empirical Studies, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 164, 
168 (1993). Roughly half fail to display the classic, most characteristic symptom of child sexual 
abuse: “Sexualized behavior.” Id. at 167 tbl.2. 
 134. “The more severe cases [are] . . . the ones most likely to remain secret.” RUSSELL, supra 
note 105, at 373. Russell reports that in 72% of the cases in which mothers were unaware of the 
abuse, more severe abuse had occurred. Id. at 372. 
 135. Abuse by father-figures occurs with greater frequency, over a longer time frame, and is 
more likely to include penetration, physical contact, force, and threats of force than abuse by others, 
surpassing the “norm” for child sexual abuse. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Children at Risk: The 
Sexual Exploitation of Female Children After Divorce, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 251, 274-76 (2001). 
 136. See Patricia G. Schnitzer & Bernard G. Ewigman, Child Deaths Resulting from Inflicted 
Injuries: Household Risk Factors and Perpetrator Characteristics, 116 PEDIATRICS e687 (2005). 
 137. See id. at e688. 
 138. Id. “Inflicted-injury death” includes death resulting from intentional abuse, but not neglect 
(unlike maltreatment death, which would include both causes of death). Id. at e687. 
 139. Id. at e690. 
 140. See id. at e689-90, e692. 
 141. Id. at e690. 
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increased risk of fatal maltreatment in single-parent households, not 
single parenthood per se.”142 
Likewise, the most recent National Incidence Study of Child Abuse 
and Neglect (“NIS”), a congressionally-mandated, periodic effort of the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to provide updated 
estimates of the incidence of child abuse and neglect143 found that 
children “living with a single parent who had a cohabitating partner in 
the household had the highest rate in all maltreatment categories.”144 
These children experienced more than eight times the rate of 
maltreatment generally, over ten times the rate of abuse, and nearly eight 
times the rate of neglect.145 A physically abused child was more likely to 
sustain a serious injury when the abuser was not a parent.146 “[M]ale 
perpetrators were more common for children maltreated by 
nonbiological parents or parents’ partners (64%) or by other persons 
(75%).”147 
This over-representation of unrelated males appears routinely in 
studies of child physical abuse, as well as maltreatment. Unrelated males 
are over-represented in all reports of maltreatment death,148 reports of 
child maltreatment,149 and studies of the risk of physical abuse.150 
                                                          
 142. Id. 
 143. SEDLAK ET AL., supra note 99, at 1, 12 (classifying children into six categories: “living 
with two married biological parents, living with other married parents (e.g., step-parent, adoptive 
parent), living with two unmarried parents, living with one parent who had an unmarried partner in 
the household, living with one parent who had no partner in the household, and living with no 
parent”). The NIS collected data in 2005 and 2006 to provide updated estimates of the incidence of 
child abuse and neglect in the United States. Id. at 1. “The NIS serves as the nation’s needs 
assessment on child abuse and neglect.” Id. While the NIS includes children “investigated by CPS 
agencies, it also obtains data on other children who were not reported to CPS or who were screened 
out by CPS without investigation.” Id. Thus it captures “both abused and neglected children who are 
in the official CPS statistics and those who are not.” Id. 
 144. Id. at 12. The lowest rate of overall maltreatment under the Harm Standard was for 
children living with two married biological parents, at 6.8 per 1000 children, while children living 
with one parent living with an unmarried partner in the household experienced the highest rate at 
57.3 per 1000 children, or “more than 8 times greater than the rate for children living with two 
married biological parents.” Id. at 5–19. 
 145. Id. at 12. The rate of abuse under the Harm Standard for children living with one parent 
and the parent’s unmarried partner was 33.6 per 1000 children, and the rate of neglect under the 
Harm Standard was 27.0 per 1000 children, compared with 2.9 and 4.2 children per 1000 children 
who lived with two married biological parents, respectively. Id. at 5–20 to 5–21. 
 146. See id. at 12. 
 147. Id. at 14. “Among all abused children . . . those abused by nonbiological parents or 
parents’ partners, or by other perpetrators were much more likely to be abused by males (74% or 
more by males versus 26% or less by females).” Id. at 15. 
 148. See Michael N. Stiffman et al., Household Composition and Risk of Fatal Child 
Maltreatment, 109 PEDIATRICS 615, 617-18 (2002). “Maltreatment death” means death that occurs 
due to neglect or intentional injury. See id. at 616. 
 149. See Aruna Radhakrishna et al., Are Father Surrogates a Risk Factor for Child 
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D. Potential Gains May Not Warrant Increased Risk 
The potential downside of granting parental rights to former male 
live-in partners is not all that should be considered. The potential upside 
also matters. Two features of the ALI’s thinned-out conception of 
parenthood suggest that the upside may be more muted across groups of 
children than the drafters presume. First, the Principles do not impose a 
duty of child support on de facto parents, even as the Principles confer 
rights on former live-in partners who meet its three-pronged test for de 
facto parenthood.151 Second, studies of parental investment show that 
step-parents and boyfriends, as a group, do not invest as heavily in 
children as do legal parents.152 
Consider, for example, a study by Sandra Hofferth and Kermyt 
Anderson of parental investment in children. The researchers compared 
levels of residential-father involvement with children by married, 
biological fathers, step-fathers (married, non-biological parents), and 
mother’s cohabitant family (unmarried, non-biological parents), all of 
whom resided with the child.153 They measured “[p]arental 
                                                          
Maltreatment?, 6 CHILD MALTREATMENT 281, 282 (2001) (“Children who had a father surrogate 
living in the home were twice as likely to be reported for maltreatment after his entry into the home 
than those with either a biological father . . . or no father figure in the home.”). 
 150. See ROBERT WHELAN, BROKEN HOMES AND BATTERED CHILDREN: A STUDY OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHILD ABUSE AND FAMILY TYPE 29 tbl.12, 31 tbl.14 (1994) (reporting a 
risk of physical abuse for children living with two natural married parents of 0.23, compared to a 
risk of 7.65 for children living with their natural mother and a cohabitant, and a risk of fatal abuse 
for children living with both natural, married parents of 0.31, compared to a risk of fatal abuse of 
22.9 for children living with their natural mother and a cohabitant); see also SEDLAK ET AL., supra 
note 99, at 5–21, 5–22 fig.5–2 (finding that the risk of physical abuse for a child living with one 
parent and that parent’s live-in partner was nearly ten times the rate for a child living with her 
married biological parents). 
 151. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (describing the ALI’s “asymmetrical” 
notion of parenthood, which grants full parental rights with none of the requisite financial duties). 
 152. Wilson, supra note 1, at 104-05. Men who believe themselves to be a child’s biological 
father may act protectively toward that child and invest in them more heavily than would a man who 
knows himself not to be the father. See Steven J. C. Gaulin & Alice Schlegel, Paternal Confidence 
and Paternal Investment: A Cross Cultural Test of a Sociobiological Hypothesis, 1 ETHOLOGY & 
SOCIOBIOLOGY 301, 306 (1980) (“In essence we are asking whether, society by society, such rules 
seem to vary together such that a ‘genetically rational’ relation exists between sexual practices and 
male investment strategies. As we show, the answer is a qualified affirmation.”); Robin Fretwell 
Wilson, Evaluating Marriage: Does Marriage Matter to the Nurturing of Children?, 42 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 847, 860-63 (2005) (discussing the role of uncertainty of paternity in parental-investment 
studies). Paternity-disestablishment cases pose thorny problems about whether to treat the duped 
party as a parent or as a third party. See, e.g., Stitham v. Henderson, 2001 ME 52, 768 A.2d 598. 
Such men may qualify for parental rights under the Principles as parents by estoppel. See supra note 
35. 
 153. Sandra L. Hofferth & Kermyt G. Anderson, Are All Dads Equal?: Biology Versus 
Marriage as a Basis for Paternal Investment, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 213, 219 (2003). Hofferth 
and Anderson used data from the 1997 Child Development Supplement to the Panel Study of 
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[i]nvolvement” in terms of time children spent actively engaged with 
their father;154 weekly hours when the father was available to the child 
but not actively engaged with the child;155 number of activities in which 
the father participated with the child in the past month;156 and “warmth” 
toward the child, as reported by fathers themselves.157 
Hofferth and Anderson found that the investments fathers make in 
their children are significantly influenced by biological-relatedness.158 
Children spent significantly more time actively engaged with a married, 
biological father than with a non-biological father, whether a step-father 
or mother’s cohabitant.159 Children engaged in significantly fewer 
activities with non-biological fathers, whether step-fathers or mother’s 
cohabitants.160 Finally, with regard to warmth, biology correlated 
positively with fathers’ own assessment of the warmth they felt toward 
the children with whom they lived.161 The increased investment in 
                                                          
Income Dynamics, a thirty-year longitudinal survey of a representative sample of U.S. men, women, 
children, and the families with whom they resided. The study sample represented 2522 children who 
were reported by the primary caregiver to be living with an adult male, “either their biological 
father, a stepfather who is a nonbiological father married to the mother, or their mother’s cohabiting 
partner.” Id. For a more in-depth discussion of outcomes for children in non-marital households and 
the impact of parental investment, see Wilson, supra note 152, at 859-64. 
 154. Hofferth & Anderson, supra note 153, at 219. This figure was obtained using a time diary 
of the child’s activities, as answered by the child and or the child’s mother, including the question 
“[w]ho was doing the activity with [the] child?” The diary captured one weekday and one weekend 
day. Figures for the weekday (multiplied by five) were added to the figure for the weekend day 
(multiplied by two) to arrive at a weekly figure. Id. at 220. 
 155. Id. at 219. This was also accomplished using the time diary, with the additional question, 
“[w]ho else was there but not directly involved in the activity?” Id. 
 156. Id. at 220. The researchers analyzed thirteen activities:  
[G]oing to the store; washing or folding clothes; doing dishes; cleaning house; preparing 
food; looking at books or reading stories; doing arts and crafts; talking about the family; 
working on homework; building or repairing something; playing computer or video 
games; playing a board game, card game, or puzzle; and playing sports or outdoor 
activities. 
Id. These questions were only asked with respect to children three years and older, with the 
result that the sample sizes are lowest for this variable. Id. 
 157. Id. The study measured warmth by the father’s responses to six items: “how often in the 
past month the father hugged each child, expressed his love, spent time with child, joked or played 
with child, talked with child, and told child he appreciated what he or she did.” Id. 
 158. Id. at 214-15. 
 159. Specifically, married biological fathers spent 15.63 hours per week engaged with their 
child, compared to 9.15 hours for step-fathers and 10.10 hours for mother’s cohabitants. Id. at 223 & 
tbl.3 (findings significant at a high level of confidence, with p < .001). 
 160. Married, biological fathers engaged in 9.13 activities with their biological child over the 
course of a month, while step-fathers engaged in 8.22 activities, and mother’s cohabitants engaged 
in 7.43 activities. Id. at 223 tbl.3, 224 (findings were significant at a high level of confidence, with 
p < .05). 
 161. Id. at 223 tbl.3 (findings were significant at a high level of confidence, with p < .001). 
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biological children persisted after controlling for socioeconomic 
factors.162 
Hofferth and Anderson concluded that biology affects a father’s 
level of engagement,163 noting that “fathers will not invest as much 
cognitively or emotionally in nonbiological as in biological offspring.”164 
They suggest several possible explanations for this difference: (1) 
particularly with regard to step-fathers, the adults may expect the step-
father to be less involved with children, and (2) particularly with regard 
to boyfriends, “parental” behavior toward their partner’s child is “so new 
that norms have not developed to guide nonmarital partners in parenting 
children.”165 While non-biological fathers do make investments in 
children, Hofferth and Anderson believe they do so in part because it 
gains them favor with the child’s mother, or “reproductive access.”166 If 
this is so, the benefits gained by children living with non-biological 
fathers may recede or disappear once the relationship between the child’s 
mother and the live-in partner ends. Therefore, Hofferth and Anderson 
would predict that even if non-biological fathers perform well in ongoing 
relationships, their performance may not be as strong when that 
relationship dissolves.167 
                                                          
 162. The researchers note, however, that differences between groups on some measures shrank 
so that “[b]iology explains less of father involvement than anticipated once differences between 
fathers are controlled.” Id. at 213. Specifically, non-biological fathers spent over five hours less per 
week on average with their children than married, biological fathers. Id. at 224 & tbl.5, 225 
(reporting that step-fathers spent 4.79 hours fewer per month engaged with their child than married, 
biological fathers, p < .01, while mother’s cohabitants spent 3.60 less hours, p < .05). Differences 
persisted for the second factor (hours available) only for step-fathers, who were available to the 
children 4.63 less hours than married, biological fathers. Id. at 224 tbl.5 (p < .01). Mothers’ 
cohabitants were available for slightly more hours every month than married, biological fathers, 
0.80 hours, but the increase was not statistically significant. Id. 
  Step-fathers and mother’s cohabitants performed significantly fewer activities with a child 
than married, biological fathers, 4.35 fewer and 5.79 fewer, respectively. Id. at 224-25 tbl.5 
(reporting p values for both findings as p < .001). 
  When it came to warmth, significant differences emerged for mothers’ cohabitants but not 
for step-fathers. Mothers’ cohabitants rated themselves less warm toward their children than did 
married, biological fathers and step-fathers, although with the latter the difference was not 
statistically significant. Id. (reporting that mother’s cohabitants rated themselves as less warm, -
1.16, with a significance value of p < .01; while step-fathers also rated themselves as less warm, -
0.38, but this was not statistically significant). 
 163. Id. at 224. 
 164. Id. at 229. 
 165. Id. at 229-30. 
 166. Id. at 215. 
 167. Although the Principles lump step-parents and unmarried, live-in partners together, 
whether a mother and her partner choose to marry matters greatly to the level of investment that he 
makes in her child. Manning and Lamb and Hofferth and Anderson found “marriage advantages” 
for marital children over non-marital children. See Wilson, supra note 152, at 859-64. 
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In short, this study and others like it168 suggest that biology 
produces real differences in investment by adults in children.169 
Certainly, selection effects may explain the results in any correlational 
study.170 Nonetheless, this emerging literature on non-biological 
caretakers suggests that, as a group, the gains children would realize 
from living with non-genetic caretakers171 may not be as great as we 
would otherwise suppose, and may represent at best modest welfare 
increases over living alone with their mothers. 
All of this suggests the upside of continuing contact between 
children and former live-in partners may not be as great as the drafters 
thought. Indeed, in order to be willing to expand dramatically the rights 
that male former live-in partners receive, one must assume that time 
taken from the mother will be better spent with her ex-partner. Yet, 
findings of no elevated risk in single-parent households suggest that a 
child who spends all of his or her time with only the mother may actually 
be better off.172 
                                                          
 168. See, e.g., Anne Case et al., How Hungry is the Selfish Gene?, 110 ECON. J. 781, 797 
(2000) (finding that the presence of a child’s biological mother “appears to increase expenditure on 
an important input into the [development] of healthy children—food”); Kory Floyd & Mark T. 
Morman, Human Affection Exchange: III. Discriminative Parental Solicitude in Men’s Affectionate 
Communication with Their Biological and Nonbiological Sons, 49 COMM. Q. 310, 323 (2001) 
(“[A]ffectionate communication should be subject to the same adaptive drives that cause parents to 
invest discriminately in their children, and [predicting that fathers] . . . would express greater 
affection to their children (in this case, sons) if they were biological children than if they were step-
children.”). Floyd and Morman found that “[t]his prediction received support in both studies for 
verbal and nonverbal forms of affection, as well as for supportive affection in the first study.” Id. 
Further, “the prediction was supported even after we covaried out the effects of relational 
involvement (and tested for potential error variance as a function of closeness, relationship 
satisfaction, and fathers’ and sons’ ages, all of which have previously shown associations with the 
amount of affection fathers communicate to their sons).” Id. at 324. 
 169. Importantly, biology alone does not fully explain or predict parental investment. Multiple 
studies of adoptive parents report that they invest as heavily in children as biological parents. See 
Laura Hamilton et al., Adoptive Parents, Adaptive Parents: Evaluating the Importance of Biological 
Ties for Parental Investment, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 95, 95 (2007). 
In this study, we compare two-adoptive-parent families with other families 
on . . . parental investment. Using data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, 
Kindergarten-First Grade Waves (ECLS-K), basic group comparisons reveal an adoptive 
advantage over all family types. This advantage is due in part to the socioeconomic 
differences between adoptive and other families. Once we control for these factors, two-
adoptive-parent families invest at similar levels as two-biological-parent families but still 
at significantly higher levels in most resources than other types of families. 
Id.; Robin Fretwell Wilson, Uncovering the Rationale for Requiring Infertility in Surrogacy 
Arrangements, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 337, 348 (2003). 
 170. See Wilson, supra note 169, at 350. 
 171. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text (discussing shared residential responsibility 
as a result of the approximation test). 
 172. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text. The ALI’s failure to acknowledge this 
social science research exemplifies a broader blind spot throughout the Principles. For example, 
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E. Synthesis of Social Science Evidence 
Time-in-residence performing caretaking duties does not 
meaningfully capture what should be the central, animating 
consideration: the quality of the child’s relationship with the mother’s 
former partner. A prominent child abuse researcher, Russell Dobash, 
notes that both de facto parents and cohabitants are “over-represented 
[among child abusers and] as such these relationships constitute risk 
factors.”173 Dobash concluded that “knowledge of the status of the 
relationship—biological or de facto—is not enough, rather it is necessary 
to investigate the quality of the relationship in order to better understand 
and evaluate risk.”174 The ALI misses this crucial point. As the next two 
Parts demonstrate, this intuition underpins the decision by many courts 
to reject the Principles’ thinned-out conception of parenthood. 
IV. COURTS EXPRESS SKEPTICISM 
In the only comprehensive empirical study of the Principles’ impact 
since their adoption in 2000, Michael Clisham and I, in 2008, examined 
databases in Westlaw and LexisNexis for any legislation or court cases 
referencing the Principles since the project’s inception in the early 
1990s.175 This Part updates that study of court cases and presents a new 
                                                          
Professor Marsha Garrison questions the ALI’s basis for treating unmarried cohabitants as if they 
are married, especially when cohabitants do not view their relationships in the same way and would 
never expect this result. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Marriage Matters: What’s Wrong with the ALI’s 
Domestic Partnership Proposal, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 1, at 305, 306-10. 
 173. E-mail from Russell Dobash, Professor of Criminology, Univ. of Manchester Sch. of Law, 
to author (Aug. 7, 2006, 07:00 AM) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review). 
 174. Id. (emphasis added).  
 175. This analysis found scant impact with the two groups at which the Principles were 
directed, rule-makers (legislators) and decision-makers (judges). Clisham & Wilson, supra note 1, at 
611. Although a single state, West Virginia, borrowed from the Principles in enacting child custody 
legislation, no state code section or proposed legislation has referenced the Principles since 1990. 
Id. at 608. Even in the custody realm, no legislature appears to have followed West Virginia in 
adopting the Principles’ custody proposals, and neither has any legislature enacted legislation to 
effect the Principles’ parent by estoppel proposals. While this empirical analysis cannot definitively 
establish that the Principles have not had some legislative influence somewhere, if legislatures are 
borrowing from the Principles, they are certainly not tipping their hands. 
  The Principles found more success with the courts, yet even this impact is slight and 
mixed. By 2008, a mere one hundred cases had cited to the Principles since 1990 (although the 
Principles were not published until 2002, courts previously cited to draft versions of the Principles), 
less than half of the number of cases that cite to two treatises published contemporaneously with the 
Principles. Id. at 576. While the cases citing the Principles come from twenty-nine states and the 
U.S. Supreme Court, courts in six New England states account for almost half (forty-eight) of those 
citations. Id. at 576, 598, 599 fig.13. How the courts use the Principles’ recommendations tells an 
even starker story. Courts reject the Principles’ recommendations more often than they accept them, 
by a ratio of 1.5 to 1. Id. at 576. But by far and away, courts use the Principles most often to “bolster 
the court’s holding in a case that would have come out the same way in the absence of the 
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empirical analysis of the Principles’ impact with judicial decision-
makers through June 29, 2010.176 By this date, 120 cases in total cited to 
the Principles.177 Of these, sixty-five cases concerned Chapter 2, which 
proposes custody and parentage rules—making this the topic cited by 
courts more than any other portion of the Principles.178 Among the sixty-
five cases, some discuss more than one provision of the Principles, 
yielding eighty discrete treatments of the Principles. As Figure 2 shows, 
while courts look to Chapter 2 for guidance on a range of issues from 
relocation to the best interests test, a plurality of the cases citing Chapter 
2, twenty-five, revolved around de facto parenthood, more than any 










                                                          
Principles” (24% of cases). Id. at 576, 597 & fig.11.   
 176. We searched the “Federal & State Cases, Combined” and the “All State and Federal 
Cases” electronic databases in LexisNexis and Westlaw on June 29, 2010, for references to the 
Principles. Recognizing that not every reference to the Principles would be in the form of a proper 
Bluebook citation, we deliberately searched for mis-cited instances of the Principles, as well as mis-
cites to the ALI. This decision was warranted. For example, in Cullum v. Cullum, 160 P.3d 231 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2007), the Principles are cited as “the American Family Institute’s comprehensive 
study, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution (1997).” Id. at 235. To capture as many 
permutations of the work’s title as possible, five different searches were performed, the search logic 
for which appears below. These searches produced 120 cases on LexisNexis and 122 cases on 
Westlaw. 
 
Finding References to the Principles 
Search Term/Logic 
“American Law Institute” & “Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution” 
“ALI” & “Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution”  
“Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution”  
“ALI Principles of Family Dissolution”  
“Principles of Family Dissolution” 
 
 177. See infra app. A. 
 178. See infra app. A, at 1159-64. Other chapters address alimony, property distribution, child 
support, pre-marital agreements, domestic partnerships, and the role of fault. 
 179. For cases discussing the best interests test, parents by estoppel, approximation standard, 
custody, relocation, and other matters, see infra app. B. 
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Figure 2: Chapter 2 Cases by Subject Matter180 
What courts do with the ALI’s recommendations is revealing. 
Using the coding protocol created for the 2008 empirical study of the 
Principles, which is reproduced in Figure 3,181 we coded the courts’ 
                                                          
 180. “Other” questions for which courts have cited Chapter 2 of the Principles include 
visitation, visitation modification, reliance on division of caretaking functions rather than the child’s 
wishes, family structure, domestic partners, parenting plans, and interference with visitation rights. 
See, e.g., Schmitz v. Schmitz, 88 P.3d 1116, 1123 (Alaska 2004) (parenting plan); Riepe v. Riepe, 
91 P.3d 312, 326 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (domestic partners); Young v. Hector, 740 So. 2d 1153, 
1157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (caretaking functions performed by legal mother); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 
2007 ME 14, ¶ 9, 915 A.2d 409, 411 (family structure); R.S. v. M.P., 894 N.E.2d 634, 639 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2008) (visitation modification); McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 35, 779 N.W.2d 
652, 666 (visitation); Sweeney v. Sweeney, 2005 ND 47, ¶ 35, 693 N.W.2d 29, 38 (interference 
with visitation rights). 
 181. While many of the coding categories are self-explanatory, such as concurrence cited 
Principles (Code 3), and Principles cited by dissent (Code 7), several categories deserve 
elaboration. Code 1 (adopted Principles’ subsection) includes cases that simply adopted a legal rule 
borrowed from the Principles, as well as lower court decisions affirmed as not being an abuse of 
discretion and which rested on a section of the Principles. Code 2 (adopted Principles’ rule with 
some modification) includes cases that borrowed heavily from the Principles, but added additional 
elements to the Principles’ test, as the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court did in In re Care & 
Prot. of Sharlene, 840 N.E.2d 918, 926 (Mass. 2006). See infra Part V.C. Code 5 (used Principles as 
a “pile-on” when the case would have come out the same way anyway) gauges the degree of 
reliance on the Principles. A case is coded as a “5” when the court relied on existing state code 
sections or case law that was on point and pre-dated the Principles, or when they borrowed from the 
law of a sister jurisdiction and only in passing noted that the borrowed approach was also consonant 
with the Principles. Code 6 (made reference to Principles, but otherwise declined to adopt the 
Principles’ rule) relies on explicit statements by a court that it is not adopting the Principles’ 
approach, or a court’s references to the Principles’ approach while affirming a different approach. 
For example, in C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 2004 ME 43, 845 A.2d. 1146, two female same-sex partners 
cohabited in a long-term relationship during which they had a child together via artificial 
insemination. Id. ¶ 2, 845 A.2d at 1147. After their relationship ended, C.E.W. sought and received 
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treatments of the Principles in de facto parent cases.182 Where a given 
case includes more than one treatment of the Principles—that is, the case 
discusses multiple subsections of the Principles—each treatment was 
coded separately.183 
                                                          
parental rights and responsibilities for the child as a de facto parent. Id., 845 A.2d at 1147. The 
Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, but decided the case on other 
grounds, concluding that that the lower court erred, stating, “Although both opinions cite to the 
[ALI’s Principles], neither adopts its standard, nor do we do so today.” Id. ¶ 14, 845 A.2d at 1152 & 
n.13; see infra Part V.A. Code 8 (declined to adopt the Principles’ rule because the question is a 
legislative one), and Code 9 (flat out rejected the Principles’ rule), rely on explicit statements by the 
court. Code 10 (Principles argued by a party but not reached by the court for procedural reasons) is 
best illustrated by the case of In re Parentage of M.F., 170 P.3d 601 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). There, 
a step-father attempted to receive residential time with his step-daughter by being named a de facto 
parent. Id. at 602-03. The court stated that “[w]e have no reason . . . to either adopt or reject” the 
Principles. Id. at 605. While declining to address the issue further, the court noted that even if 
Section 2.04(1)(c) of the Principles was adopted, the step-father would not have a cause of action. 
Id. As Figure 4 shows, no de facto parent cases fell into Codes 4, 11, and 12. For examples of non-
de facto parent cases that fall into these codes, see Clisham & Wilson, supra note 1, at 584, 588. 
 182. Two of the research assistants who worked on this Article (William Bridges and Merilys 
Huhn) independently coded the courts’ treatments of the Principles using the coding protocol 
contained in Figure 3. In order to measure inter-rater reliability, we used Jacob Cohen’s calculation 
of kappa coefficient. See generally Jacob Cohen, A Coefficient of Agreement for Nominal Scales, 20 
EDUC. & PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 37 (1960). We tallied the agreement of the two raters over the 
twelve coding categories for each of the twenty-five discrete de facto parent cases citing the 
Principles. In three instances, there was initial disagreement among the coders. This yielded a kappa 
coefficient for our raters of 0.3333. According to Richard Landis and Gary Koch, a kappa value 
between 0.21 and 0.40 should be interpreted as fair agreement. See J. Richard Landis & Gary G. 
Koch, The Measurement of Observer Agreement for Categorical Data, 33 BIOMETRICS 159, 165 
(1977). 
 183. An example of this occurred in E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d. 886 (Mass. 1999). There, 
both the majority and the dissenting opinions cited the Principles. The majority used the Principles 
to bolster the opinion they would have reached regardless of the existence of the Principles (Code 
5), while the dissent also referenced the Principles (Code 3). Id. at 896-97 (Fried, J., dissenting). 
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Figure 3: Lines of Cases Broken Down by Treatment184 
 
Code Treatment Tally 
% of 
Tally 
1 Adopted the Principles’ subsection 1 4.00 
2 
Adopted the Principles’ rule with some 
modification  
2 8.00 
3 Concurrence cited the Principles 3 12.00 
4 Used the Principles to inform existing tests  0 0.00 
5 
Used the Principles as a “pile-on” when the case 
would have come out the same way anyway  
6 24.00 
6 
Made reference to the Principles, but otherwise 
declined to adopt the Principles’ rule 
4 16.00 
7 Principles cited by dissent 5 20.00 
8 
Declined to adopt the Principles’ rule because the 
question is a legislative one 
1 4.00 
9 Flat out rejected the Principles’ rule 1 4.00 
10 
Principles argued by a party but not reached by 
the court for procedural reasons  
2 8.00 
11 




Cited the Principles for a description of the 
majority rule 
0 0.00 
Total 25 100 
 
In order to tease out the impact of the Principles, we also 
constructed discrete lines of cases using Keycite searches of each case.185 
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, a rule can only be adopted once in a 
given jurisdiction.186 Thus, subsequent cites to the initial case that 
announced the rule are as much a function of stare decisis as they are of 






                                                          
 184. Some lines of cases are counted more than once. For example, the majority in E.N.O. 
adopted the Principles, but the dissent also cited the Principles. See id.  
 185. Using the Keycite results in Westlaw’s database, we also examined whether an opinion 
was subsequently withdrawn after a rehearing en banc, legislatively abrogated, or otherwise 
overturned. We found no negative history for the twenty-five de facto parent cases citing the 
Principles. See infra apps. A & B. 
 186. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1443 (8th ed. 2004) (defining stare decisis as “[t]he doctrine 
of precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the 
same points arise again in litigation”). 
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Figure 4 graphically depicts the treatment by judges of the 
Principles, when analyzed by lines of cases. The dissent cited the 
Principles (Code 7) in one in five cases (20%), while in 12% of the cases 
a concurrence cited the Principles (Code 3).187 The remaining citations 
occur in majority opinions. Some of these cases embrace the Principles 
(Code 1, 4%),188 while others use the Principles as a starting point for 
more refined tests (Code 2, 8%).189 Others decline to accept the 
Principles’ test (Code 6, 16%), decline to adopt the rule because such 
questions are best addressed by the legislature (Code 8, 4%), or reject the 
ALI’s approach outright (Code 9, 4%).190 
The overwhelming use of the Principles by courts is as a “pile-on” 
to support an outcome the court would have reached anyway under its 
own precedent or state law (Code 5, 24%).191 A case that best illustrates 
this phenomenon is Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins.192 There, the court 
                                                          
 187. Instances in which concurrences cited the Principles include Stitham v. Henderson, 2001 
ME 52, 768 A.2d 598, 605-06 (Saufley, J., concurring); Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 40, 
761 A.2d 291, 306-07 (Wathen, C.J., concurring); and McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 35, 
779 N.W.2d 652, 666 (Crothers, J., concurring). See infra app. C. 
 188. See supra Figure 3; infra app. C, at 1174. 
 189. See supra Figure 3; infra app. C, at 1175. 
 190. See supra Figure 3; infra app. C, at 1177-78. 
 191. See supra Figure 3; infra app. C, at 1176. 
 192. 2006 VT 78, 912 A.2d 951.  Other instances in which courts used the Principles as a “pile-
on” include: Osterkamp v. Stiles, 235 P.3d 178, 187 (Alaska 2010); Eccleston v. Bankosky, 780 
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referenced the Principles as additional support for its recognition of 
parental rights for a “same-gender partner of a person who adopts a child 
or conceives through artificial insemination,”193 but made no reference to 
the Principles’ test for de facto parenthood. The Principles would not 
have changed the outcome because the court looked at the legal nature of 
the live-in partners’ relationship to each other when a child was born to 
one of them—not the partner’s relationship to the child, as the Principles 
would do. Like Miller-Jenkins, in nearly a quarter of cases, the 
Principles serve as an obligatory footnote—used by judges, as Judge 
Robert Sack once quipped, “like drunks use lampposts . . . more for 
support than for illumination.”194 
Grouping the lines of cases into positive treatments (Codes 1, 2, and 
4) and negative treatments (Codes 6, 8, and 9) is especially revealing. 
The six negative treatments exceed the positive treatments by a ratio of 
two-to-one, as Figure 5 shows. Cases citing the Principles in a more 
neutral manner (Codes 3, 5, 7, 10, 11, and 12) eclipse both the positive 












                                                          
N.E.2d 1266, 1274 n.16 (Mass. 2003); Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1061 n.15 (Mass. 2002); 
Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 27, 761 A.2d at 302; and Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 974-95 (R.I. 
2000). See infra app. C. In Miller-Jenkins, a same-sex couple, Janet and Lisa Miller-Jenkins, entered 
into a civil union in Vermont in 2000, then moved to Virginia where Lisa gave birth to a child, IMJ, 
via artificial insemination in 2002. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT 78, ¶ 3, 912 A.2d at 956. When IMJ 
was four months old, Lisa and Janet moved to Vermont. Id. ¶ 3, 912 A.2d at 956. They separated in 
2003, at which point Lisa moved back to Virginia with IMJ and sought custodial rights for herself 
and parent-child contact for Janet, which the court granted temporarily. Id. ¶ 3-4, 912 A.2d at 956. 
Lisa subsequently refused to give Janet contact with IMJ in violation of the court order, touching off 
a custody battle involving the courts of both Virginia and Vermont. Id. ¶ 5-6, 912 A.2d at 956-57. 
While the case dealt with a number of jurisdictional issues, on the question of Janet’s parental rights, 
the Supreme Court of Vermont ultimately resolved the question in Janet’s favor. Id. ¶ 56, 72, 912 
A.2d at 970, 974. The law granted Janet a presumption of parentage because she was Lisa’s legal 
spouse at the time of birth. Id. ¶ 56, 912 A.2d at 970. 
 193. Id. at 972. 
 194. Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges are Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at A8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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This empirical snapshot suggests that, on the whole, the judicial 
response to the ALI’s proposal for de facto parenthood has been tepid at 
best. As the next Part shows, an in-depth examination of the decisions 
citing the Principles’ test reveals that modern courts are generally 
unwilling to grant full parental rights on the basis of only time and 
caretaking. These courts refuse to accept the ALI’s test without adding 
more demanding requirements to safeguard the welfare of children and 
preserve the prerogatives of legal parents. Indeed, many courts still 
exhibit a preference for the rights of legal parents to raise and care for 
their children. 
V. PRESERVING THE GOOD WITHOUT REWARDING THE BAD 
An important lens for evaluating the success of the ALI’s test in the 
marketplace of ideas about parental rights and responsibilities is whether 
courts are willing to hand-out the full set of parental rights envisioned by 
the ALI to live-in partners who performed caretaking functions for a 
child. To capture the degree of the Principles’ success, we constructed 
the categories contained in Appendix D. These assess whether a given 
decision: 
 
 Recognizes a live-in partner as a de facto parent entitled to full 
parental rights; 
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 Recognizes a live-in partner as a de facto parent who receives 
less than full parental rights; 
 Recognizes a live-in partner as a de facto parent but remands for 
a determination of the partner’s rights; 
 Recognizes a live-in partner as a de facto parent but concludes 
that such a person is entitled to no parental rights; 
 Concludes that the live-in partner is not a de facto parent; 
 Awards parental rights to a live-in partner on some other basis, 
even when cognizant of the ALI’s less-demanding approach; 
 Rejects the idea of parental rights for live-in partners; or 
 For some reason does not reach the issue of whether a live-in 
partner was a de facto parent. 
 
At the outset, it is important to note that the set of litigants asserting 
rights as de facto parents is by no means limited to the group of 
individuals about which this Article is concerned: heterosexual men who 
previously lived with a child and his or her mother. Indeed, much of the 
courts’ resistance to the ALI’s thinned-out test for parental rights has 
occurred in cases involving same-sex partners;195 former husbands who 
were duped into believing they were a child’s biological father, only to 
learn later that they are genetic strangers;196 and relatives of a child who 
step forward to provide care when the legal parent cannot.197 While 
many courts see these claims as sympathetic, the courts are reluctant 
nonetheless to embrace full-blown parental rights based only on the bare 
showing of time-in-residence and chores performed for a child. 
 As this Part documents, and as Figure 6 illustrates, a close reading 
of the de facto parent cases reveals a deep skepticism about the ALI’s 
test. The single court willing to hand out the full panoply of parental 
rights envisioned by the ALI did so in C.E.W. v. D.E.W.,198 in which the 
parties stipulated to de facto parent status; the court otherwise declined 
to adopt the ALI’s test.199 The handful of cases awarding visitation to 
former live-in partners make clear that the award must serve the child’s 
best interests, a consideration supplanted by the ALI’s mechanical 
approximation test.200 Three other cases were remanded for a 
determination of rights.201 One case concluded the de facto parents 
                                                          
 195. See supra note 192; infra notes 240-57 and accompanying text. 
 196. See infra notes 294-304 and accompanying text. 
 197. See infra note 248. 
 198. 2004 ME 43, 845 A.2d 1146. 
 199. See infra Part V.A. 
 200. See infra Part V.B. 
 201. See Figure 6, category 3; infra app. D, category 3, at 1182-83. 
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should receive no parental rights,202 while a host of others concluded 
either that a live-in partner failed to carry the burden of proof, or that the 
legal parent should retain discretion about such matters.203 Throughout 
the latter, the courts put a significant thumb on the scale both for 
safeguarding children using welfare and harm determinations and for 
protecting the prerogatives of legal parents to decide who may, and may 
not, see their children.204  
 
Figure 6: Rights Sought and Received 
 
 
A. The Rare Case Awarding Full Rights 
In the sole case awarding full parental rights, C.E.W., the rights 
awarded resulted from a crucial stipulation in the litigation by both 
parties, namely that a former same-sex live-in partner was indeed a 
child’s de facto parent.205 In that case, C.E.W. filed a complaint in 
superior court against her former same-sex partner, D.E.W., the child’s 
                                                          
 202. See Figure 6, category 4; infra app. D, category 4, at 1183. 
 203. See infra Part V.D. 
 204. See infra Part V.D. 
 205. C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 2004 ME 43, ¶ 6, 845 A.2d 1146, 1148. 
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biological mother via artificial insemination.206 C.E.W. sought a 
declaration of her parental rights and responsibilities for the child and 
sought to equitably estop D.E.W. from denying her status as a parent.207 
The two women made the decision to have the child together and signed 
a parenting agreement outlining their intention to maintain equal parental 
status with regard to the child.208 The superior court accepted both 
parties’ stipulation that C.E.W. had acted as the child’s de facto parent, 
and entered a summary judgment declaring C.E.W. eligible for “an 
award of parental rights and responsibilities.”209 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the lower 
court’s ruling, finding no error of law.210 Because C.E.W.’s status as a de 
facto parent was not contested, the court limited itself to “the remedy 
once . . . de facto parenthood has been [established].”211 Not to be 
misunderstood, however, the court noted in a footnote that it was not 
adopting the ALI’s test.212 Indeed, the court noted that when the term de 
facto parent is ultimately “fleshed out by the [l]egislature or courts in the 
future, it must surely be limited to those adults who have fully and 
completely undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and 
responsible parental role in [a] child’s life.”213 The court’s rich, holistic 
understanding of parenthood is precisely the kind of qualitative 
assessment envisioned by Professor Dobash in Part II supra, but rejected 
by the ALI in favor of a mechanical test. Moreover, in sharp contrast to 
the ALI’s approach, the live-in partner ultimately provided financial 
support for the child, who lived primarily with the live-in partner.214 
B. Visitation Requires a Showing of Best Interests 
On the question of the scope of rights de facto parents should 
receive, the outright adoptions of the ALI’s test are as instructive as the 
cases rebuffing the ALI’s approach. All adoptions of the Principles 
occurred in a single line of Massachusetts cases beginning with Youmans 
                                                          
 206. Id. ¶ 2, 845 A.2d at 1147. 
 207. Id. ¶ 5-6, 845 A.2d at 1147-48. 
 208. Id. ¶ 3, 845 A.2d at 1147. 
 209. Id. ¶ 6, 845 A.2d at 1148. 
 210. Id. ¶ 14, 845 A.2d at 1152. 
 211. Id. ¶ 14, 845 A.2d at 1152. 
 212. Id. ¶ 14 n.13, 845 A.2d at 1152 n.13 (noting that two earlier cases in Maine “cite to the 
ALI Principles, [but] neither adopts its standard, nor do we do so today”). 
 213. Id. at ¶ 14, 845 A.2d at 1152. 
 214. E-mail from Mary Bonauto, Civil Rights Project Director, Gay & Lesbian Advocates & 
Defenders, to Merilys Huhn, Research Assistant to author, Wash. & Lee Sch. of Law (Sept. 8, 2010, 
1:59 PM EST) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review) (providing summary from memory because 
she lacked forwarding address for C.E.W. and explaining that the child ultimately resided with the 
former live-in partner, who financially supported the child). 
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v. Ramos.215 There, Youmans sought custody of his daughter, Tamika E., 
from Tamika’s aunt and permanent guardian, Ramos, with whom 
Tamika had lived for most of her life.216 The trial judge vacated Ramos’s 
guardianship and awarded custody of Tamika E. to Youmans, but 
granted Ramos visitation rights and telephone contact.217 Youmans 
appealed, arguing that the trial judge lacked the authority to order 
visitation with Ramos in the absence of a statute permitting visitation 
rights for a non-parent.218 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
upheld the lower court’s ruling, adopting verbatim the ALI’s definition 
and treatment of de facto parents.219 Crucially, this decision garnered 
Ramos only visitation, not the full panoply of parental rights 
contemplated by the Principles.220 
Following Youmans, Massachusetts courts applied the ALI’s test for 
de facto parent to award visitation in a second case, E.N.O. v. L.M.M.,221 
but required a showing that visitation served the child’s best interests.222 
There, the plaintiff, E.N.O., filed a complaint seeking visitation rights 
and seeking to enforce a prior agreement with her former same-sex 
partner to allow E.N.O. to adopt L.M.M.’s biological child and assume 
joint custody.223 The couple made the decision to have a child together, 
and E.N.O. acted as the family’s primary bread-winner.224 The couple 
eventually split up, and L.M.M. denied E.N.O. access to their child.225 
After a hearing, a probate court judge applied the “best interests of the 
child” standard, and awarded E.N.O. temporary visitation rights pending 
trial.226 On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
affirmed.227 The court noted the adoption of the Principles’ test in 
Youmans and applied it.228 But as with Youmans, this netted the mother’s 
former partner only visitation.229 Moreover, de facto parent status did not 
trigger an automatic entitlement to parental rights, as it would under the 
Principles.230 Instead, even granting temporary visitation to the de facto 
                                                          
 215. 711 N.E.2d 165, 167 n.3 (Mass. 1999); see infra app. C, Code 1, at 1174. 
 216. Youmans, 711 N.E.2d at 166-67. 
 217. Id. at 167. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 167 n.3, 170 n.15, 171, 173-74. 
 220. Id. at 167, 174. 
 221. 711 N.E.2d 886, 890 (Mass. 1999). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 889. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 227. Id. at 894. 
 228. Id. at 891. 
 229. Id. at 893. 
 230. Id. at 891-93. 
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parent required a finding that continuing contact would be in the child’s 
best interests.231 
It is true that in two of the five cases awarding only visitation, the 
live-in partner sought only visitation and not full custody. Nonetheless, 
in three cases, the parties sought full parental rights that the courts 
refused to grant. For instance, in R.D. v. A.H.,232 the former live-in 
girlfriend of the biological father, R.D., and the child’s de facto parent 
sought permanent guardianship with custody in a contest with the 
biological father.233 While the court did not disturb the prior 
determination that R.D. was the child’s de facto parent, it rejected her 
claim for full custody because she could not prove that the biological 
father was an unfit parent.234 R.D. was granted visitation rights only.235 
C. Many Courts Demand Proof of Harm Missing from the ALI’s Test 
Just as the outright adoptions are instructive, so too are the 
modifications of the ALI’s test. As the Introduction to this Article 
chronicled in excruciating detail, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court modified the ALI’s test to avoid an unthinkable result in Haleigh’s 
case, that her abuser, Jason Strickland, would step into the shoes of her 
parent as medical decision-maker.236 The court clarified that when a 
child develops a significant, preexisting relationship with a live-in 
partner or other adult, with the parent’s assent, it is that relationship that 
“would allow an inference, when evaluating a child’s best interests, that 
measurable harm would befall the child on the disruption of that 
relationship.”237 Far from dispensing with the best interests test in favor 
of a time-in/time-out entitlement to shared custody, the court emphasized 
that the child’s best interests and welfare remain the driving 
consideration.238 Other courts have followed this lead, awarding 
visitation rights to a live-in partner only when it serves the child’s best 
interests to do so.239 
In A.H. v. M.P.,240 the same court affirmed a lower court’s finding 
that a same-sex live-in partner did not qualify as a de facto parent.241 In 
so doing, the court made clear that harm to the child matters in this 
                                                          
 231. Id. at 890-93. 
 232. 912 N.E.2d 958 (Mass. 2009). 
 233. Id. at 961. 
 234. Id. at 968-69. 
 235. Id. at 968. 
 236. In re Care & Prot. of Sharlene, 840 N.E.2d 918, 927 (Mass. 2006). 
 237. Id. at 926. 
 238. Id. 
 239. See infra app. C, Code 2, at 1175. 
 240. 857 N.E.2d 1061 (Mass. 2006). 
 241. Id. at 1064, 1076. 
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assessment.242 Caretaking functions serve as “one means by which to 
anchor the best interests of the child analysis” in making an “objectively 
reasonable assessment of whether disruption of the adult-child 
relationship is potentially harmful to the child’s best interests.”243 But the 
“potential harm to the child is, of course, the criterion that tips the 
balance in favor of continuing contact with a de facto parent against the 
wishes of the fit legal parent.”244 Because of the need to demonstrate 
harm, A.H., the same-sex partner of the child’s biological mother, M.P., 
failed to meet her burden of proof showing that she was a de facto 
parent.245 After the two separated, A.H. sued for joint physical and legal 
custody of, and visitation with, M.P.’s child.246 The Middlesex Division 
of the Probate and Family Court Department dismissed her complaint, 
concluding that “however salutary to the child, [A.H.’s relationship with 
the child] did not rise[] . . . to that of a parental relationship.”247 On 
appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court refused to “disturb” 
the lower court’s judgment for a number of reasons, including the 
judge’s “broad discretion to consider the impact of parental activity other 
than caretaking on forming the crucial parent-child bond.”248 As Figure 6 
                                                          
 242. Id. at 1072. 
 243. Id. at 1071. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 1069. 
 246. Id. at 1067-68. 
 247. Id. at 1068-69, 1072 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 248. Id. at 1071-72. Courts have modified the Principles’ test in other instances. See In re 
Guardianship of Estelle, 875 N.E.2d 515 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007); Smith v. Jones, 868 N.E.2d 629 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (recognizing the earlier application of the Principles in A.H. v. M.P.); In re 
Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005) (en banc). 
  In the case of In re Parentage of L.B., the plaintiff, Carvin, and defendant, Britain, were in 
a same-sex relationship for a little more than a decade, during which time they decided to have a 
child, L.B., and Britain was artificially inseminated. 122 P.3d at 163-64. The couple split up when 
L.B. was nearly six years old, and Britain cut Carvin off from all contact with L.B. Id. at 164. 
Carvin filed petition for the establishment of parentage in King County Superior Court, seeking to 
be declared either a parent by estoppel or a de facto parent. Id. The family court commissioner 
dismissed the petition, and the trial judge affirmed the ruling and held that Carvin lacked standing 
under the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”) and as a de facto parent. Id. On appeal, the court of 
appeals reversed the superior court’s decision, determining that because the legislature had not 
addressed relationships like the one at hand, the matter was left to be resolved under the common 
law. Id. at 165. The court looked to other state courts, recognized the common law rights of de facto 
parents, and held that such rights exist in Washington aside from the UPA. Id. at 165. The Supreme 
Court of Washington affirmed the court of appeals with regard to de facto parenthood, but remanded 
the case for a determination of whether or not Carvin met the conditions for de facto parenthood. Id. 
at 179-80. To be recognized as a de facto parent required a showing that “(1) the natural or legal 
parent consented to and fostered the parent-like relationship, (2) the petitioner and the child lived 
together in the same household, (3) the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood without 
expectation of financial compensation, and (4) the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length 
of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship, parental in 
nature.” Id. at 176. Even if so recognized, a “de facto parent is not entitled to any parental 
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shows, A.H. v. M.P. is not alone in rejecting de facto parent status on the 
facts before the court. Indeed, this formed the second largest group of 
cases when analyzed by rights sought and those received.249 
Other cases that fail to find that a live-in partner qualified as a de 
facto parent also emphasize best interests and harm considerations. For 
example, in Smith v. Jones,250 Smith and Jones began a same-sex 
relationship in 1995.251 In 2002, Jones adopted the child in dispute, 
Liza.252 After their relationship ended in 2004, Smith and Jones arranged 
for visitation with Liza as well as Smith’s adopted daughter, but soon 
Smith filed for joint legal and physical custody of both children.253 The 
trial judge denied Smith’s petition, finding she did not reach de facto 
parent status because she lacked four criteria: “intent, time, harm, and 
‘best interests.’”254 The Appeals Court of Massachusetts affirmed.255 
Although harm may come to Liza from severing her relationship with 
Smith, that harm would be mitigated by Liza’s relationship with 
Jones.256 Further, Smith failed to demonstrate intent to co-parent Liza 
while the couple was together because Jones made major decisions about 
Liza’s well being without consulting Smith—for instance, when she 
made the final decision to adopt Liza, and when she failed to authorize 
Smith to make medical decisions for Liza.257 As with the modification 
cases, Smith restates the centrality of an affirmative finding that no 
                                                          
privileges, as a matter of right, but only as is determined to be in the best interests at the child.” Id. 
at 177. The supreme court referred to the Principles twice in footnotes, first when determining that 
the UPA did not preclude the common law with regard to de facto parenthood since the UPA did not 
address such situations, and again when discussing cases from other jurisdictions recognizing the 
ALI’s concept of de facto parenthood. Id. at 175 n.23, 176 n.24. 
  In the case of In re Guardianship of Estelle, Estelle’s biological father, who had 
previously been uninvolved in her life, filed a motion to terminate the guardianship of the child’s 
aunt and uncle. 875 N.E.2d at 516. The Worcester Division of the Probate and Family Court 
Department created a co-guardianship, finding that removing the child from the aunt and uncle’s 
home would not be in the child’s best interests, but that the father was not entirely unfit as a parent. 
Id. at 516-17. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed and remanded the case, 
instructing the trial court to consider whether or not the aunt and uncle should be considered de 
facto parents in accordance with the Principles and prior state case law. Id. at 520-21. The court 
stressed, however, that “[a]t a minimum, the fitness of a particular parent cannot be judged without 
consideration of that parent's willingness and ability to care for the child, as well as the effect on a 
child of being placed in the custody of that parent.” Id. at 519. 
 249. See infra app. D, category 5, at 1183-84. 
 250. 868 N.E.2d 629 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). 
 251. Id. at 630. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 631. 
 254. Id. at 630 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 633-34. The court recognized the earlier adoption of the Principles regarding de 
facto parenthood in E.N.O. Id. at 631-32. 
 257. Id. at 634-35. 
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further contact will harm the child in ways that cannot be compensated 
for by the legal parent. 
D. Courts Place a Thumb on the Scale for Mothers’  
Prerogative to Decide 
Just as the cases modifying the Principles’ test emphasize the 
welfare-protecting best interests test, so, too, do the cases that outright 
reject the ALI’s approach. These cases go a step further, however, and 
place a thumb on the scale for the mother’s prerogative to decide what 
happens with her child. Consider Janice M. v. Margaret K,258in which 
the court unambiguously rejected the Principles.259 During the eighteen 
years in which Janice M. and Margaret K. were in a committed, same-
sex relationship, Janice M. adopted a daughter, Maya.260 Following their 
break-up, Janice M. first imposed restrictions on Margaret K.’s visits 
with Maya, then denied visitation altogether.261 Margaret K. sued for 
visitation rights claiming that she qualified as a de facto parent.262 
The court refused to accept de facto parenthood as a legal status in 
Maryland, noting that even in jurisdictions that recognize the status, 
“where visitation or custody is sought over the objection of the 
[biological] parent . . . the de facto parent must establish that the legal 
parent is either unfit or that exceptional circumstances exist.”263 
Exceptional circumstances are not determined by a rigid test; instead all 
the factors before the court in a given case come into play.264 The court 
acknowledged that while meeting “the requirements [for] . . . de facto 
parent status [may be] . . . a strong factor to be considered in assessing 
whether exceptional circumstances exist[,]” it would not be 
“determinative as a matter of law.”265 Clearly, the requirement of 
exceptional circumstances erects a higher bar to awarding parental rights 
over the objection of the legal parent than the ALI’s chores and time-in-
residence test. 
As Figure 6 illustrates, many courts take a hard, in-depth look at the 
quality of the relationship between the child and the live-in partner, 
requiring that the live-in partner fulfill the child’s psychological needs 
for a parent and be seen by the child as a parent.266 Some of these courts 
                                                          
 258. 948 A.2d 73 (Md. 2008). 
 259. See id. at 100-02. 
 260. Id. at 75. 
 261. Id. at 76. 
 262. Id. at 75-77. 
 263. Id. at 87. 
 264. Id. at 92. 
 265. Id. at 93. 
 266. See infra app. D, category 7, at 1187-88. 
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require a showing entirely absent from the ALI’s test.267 Once a live-in 
partner meets the de facto parent standard, he must overcome the 
presumption that the child’s biological parent is acting in the child’s best 
interests by denying access.268 He must also show that ending the child’s 
ongoing relationship with the de facto parent would affirmatively injure 
the child.269 Consider McAllister v. McAllister.270 Robin McAllister met 
and moved in with Mark McAllister while she was pregnant with E.M., 
her child by another man.271 Mark was the only father E.M. knew 
growing up. Thus, Mark sought custody of E.M. after he and Robin 
divorced in 2008.272 The court recognized the role of a psychological 
parent, noting that “[a] person who provides a child’s daily care and 
who, thereby, develops a close bond and personal relationship with the 
child becomes the psychological parent to whom the child turns for love, 
guidance, and security.”273 Because Mark McAllister provided E.M.’s 
daily care, had raised her from birth, and developed a close bond and 
personal relationship with E.M., the court considered Mark her 
psychological parent.274 Nevertheless, with regard to custody, the court 
concluded that a finding of psychological parenthood was not 
dispositive.275 Instead, in situations where  
a psychological parent and a natural parent each seek a court-ordered 
award of custody, the natural parent’s paramount right to custody 
prevails unless the court finds it in the child’s best interests to award 
custody to the psychological parent to prevent serious harm or 
detriment to the welfare of the child.276 
Thus, psychological parenthood alone was not enough. Mark ultimately 
received reasonable visitation and communication rights, but Robin 
retained decision-making responsibility and primary-residential 
responsibility of E.M.277 A special concurrence by Justice Crothers cited 
to the Principles for his contention that it is the legislature, and not the 
court, that is best “equipped to gather broad public input and distill 
                                                          
 267. See infra app. D, category 6, at 1185-87. 
 268. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Victoria R., 2009-NMCA-007, ¶ 16, 201 P.3d 169, 177; 
McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 15, 779 N.W.2d 652, 658. 
 269. See, e.g., McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 15, 779 N.W.2d at 658; In re Victoria R., 2009-
NMCA-007, ¶ 16, 201 P.3d at 177. 
 270. 2010 ND 40, 779 N.W.2d 652. 
 271. Id. ¶ 2, 779 N.W.2d at 655. 
 272. Id., 779 N.W.2d at 655. 
 273. Id. ¶ 15, 779 N.W.2d at 658 (quoting Hamers v. Guttormson, 2000 ND 93, ¶ 5, 610 
N.W.2d 758 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 274. See id. ¶ 16, 779 N.W.2d at 658-59. 
 275. Id. ¶ 15, 779 N.W.2d at 658. 
 276. Id. ¶ 15, 779 N.W.2d at 658. 
 277. Id. ¶ 27, 779 N.W.2d at 662. 
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public preferences for handling the hard choices and complex issues 
involved in determining third-party custody and visitation from the many 
options available.”278 Although the court was clearly aware of the 
Principles, the ALI’s test had little traction. 
In re Guardianship of Victoria R.279 provides a second illustration of 
a court placing significant weight on protecting the prerogatives of 
mothers to decide matters for their children, this time in a case involving 
third parties. There, a biological mother, Galadriel R., gave her daughter, 
Victoria R., to the petitioners, Debbie and Francisco L., in an informal 
placement after she found herself unable to care for her daughter.280 
When Galadriel R. sought Victoria R.’s return, the couple refused and 
commenced proceedings seeking legal recognition of their relationship 
with Victoria under New Mexico’s Kinship Guardianship Act 
(“KGA”).281 The KGA provides that a guardian may be appointed “‘only 
if . . . the child has resided with the petitioner without the parent for a 
period of ninety days or more immediately preceding the date the 
petition is filed and . . . there are extraordinary circumstances.’”282 The 
court held that the weight of the evidence showed that the couple had 
assumed the role of Victoria’s “psychological parents” such that she 
would “suffer a significant degree of depression if the relationship with 
the psychological parents is abruptly terminated,” and that this sufficed 
to “establish extraordinary circumstances within the meaning of the 
KGA.”283 In reaching its result, the court acknowledged the Principles as 
providing support for the concept of de facto parenthood, but primarily 
cited to numerous legislative enactments and judicial decisions that have 
adopted variations of the concept.284 The court ultimately found that 
psychological parents may rebut the presumption that a birth parent acts 
in the best interests of a child if they can show that the child will suffer a 
“significant degree of depression.”285 Obviously, such a requirement 
demands the kind of case-by-case inquiry expressly rejected by the ALI. 
Other courts jealously protect the prerogatives of legal parents to 
police who receives access to their children, using the doctrine of 
standing. For example, in a case involving a same-sex couple, White v. 
White,286 Leslea and Michelle White began a same-sex relationship in 
1999, which concluded in 2004 after each had given birth to a child via 
                                                          
 278. Id. ¶ 35, 779 N.W.2d at 666 (Crothers, J., concurring). 
 279. 2009-NMCA-007, 201 P.3d 169. 
 280. Id. ¶ 1-2, 201 P.3d at 169-70. 
 281. Id. ¶ 3, 201 P.3d at 170. 
 282. Id. ¶ 5, 201 P.3d at 170-71 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-10B-8(B)(3) (West 2003)). 
 283. Id. ¶ 16, 201 P.3d at 177 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 284. Id. ¶ 14-15, 201 P.3d at 175-77. 
 285. Id. ¶ 16, 201 P.3d at 177 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 286. 293 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). 
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artificial insemination: Michelle to C.E.W. and Leslea to Z.A.W.287 
Beginning in 2006, Michelle refused to let Leslea and Z.A.W. have any 
contact with C.E.W., so Leslea filed a petition for a declaration of 
maternity, custody, and child support.288 The trial court dismissed 
Leslea’s petition, and the Court of Appeals of Missouri affirmed 
because, most significantly, Leslea lacked standing to bring a suit.289 
Because C.E.W. already had an identified natural mother, Leslea could 
not sue to declare a mother-child relationship under Missouri’s Uniform 
Parentage Act (“MoUPA”).290 Furthermore, although MoUPA was not 
the sole means of establishing parentage in Missouri, even if Leslea did 
act in loco parentis or as a de facto parent while she and Michelle were 
together, the status terminated when they broke up.291 Finally, Leslea 
could not pursue a claim of equitable estoppel because it is a defensive 
claim and not a basis for standing.292 Leslea cited the Principles for a 
definition of de facto parenthood, but the court declined to adopt the 
rule.293 
E. Courts that Pass Over the ALI’s Test for Another Approach 
As Figure 6 demonstrates, the greatest bulk of de facto parent cases 
citing the Principles dispatch the claim by a live-in partner or other third 
party on a different basis than the ALI’s test—often over the urging of a 
concurrence or dissent that the ALI’s test would provide the better 
decisional tool.294 This occurred, for example, in Stitham v. 
Henderson.295 There, during the course of Henderson’s marriage to 
Norma, Norma gave birth to a child, K.M.H.296 The couple subsequently 
                                                          
 287. Id. at 6. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. at 6, 11. 
 290. Id. at 9. 
 291. Id. at 16. 
 292. Id. at 16-17. 
 293. Id. at 14-16. 
 294. In Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, 761 A.2d 291, the Rideouts petitioned the district 
court for visitation with their three grandchildren under the Grandparents Visitation Act, ME. REV. 
STAT. tit. 19-A, §§ 1801–05 (1998). Id. ¶ 2, 761 A.2d at 294. The district court found that the 
Rideouts met the statutory requirements to be entitled to visitation rights, but held that the Act was 
an unconstitutional violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. ¶ 6, 761 A.2d at 295. On appeal, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to apply the 
Act, concluding that the state has a compelling interest in allowing grandparents who have acted as 
parents to pursue the right to have continued contact with their grandchildren. Id. ¶ 2, 761 A.2d at 
294. The concurrence cited the Principles in support of the court’s ruling as evidence of a trend to 
recognize de facto parenthood and bestow visitation rights upon such adults. See id. ¶ 40, 761 A.2d 
at 306-07. 
 295. 2001 ME 52, 768 A.2d 598. 
 296. Id. ¶ 2, 768 A.2d at 599. 
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divorced, and Henderson was awarded contact with K.M.H. and ordered 
to pay child support.297 After the divorce, Norma married Stitham, and a 
DNA test showed that Stitham was K.M.H.’s biological father.298 Norma 
filed a motion in district court seeking a declaration that Henderson was 
not K.M.H.’s biological father, but the court denied the motion on the 
ground of res judicata.299 Stitham subsequently filed an action in superior 
court against Henderson requesting that Stitham be declared K.M.H.’s 
biological father.300 Court-ordered DNA testing showed that Henderson 
was not K.M.H.’s biological father.301 Henderson then moved to 
counterclaim in order to establish his parental rights. Stitham objected 
and moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the court.302 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine affirmed the lower 
court, but left it up to the district court in the pending post-divorce action 
to decide whether Henderson’s continued participation in K.M.H.’s life 
was in K.M.H.’s best interest.303 The concurrence referred to the 
Principles, urging that the district court had the authority to recognize 
Henderson as K.M.H.’s de facto parent.304 
The court in In re Parentage of M.F.305 also passed on the ALI’s 
test, although it clearly was aware of the Principles’ recommendation. 
There, the child’s former step-father, John Corbin, sued to be declared a 
de facto parent of the child, M.F.306 While the state of Washington 
recognized the common law classification of de facto parent, the court 
held that the designation was not available in this case because as the 
child’s step-father, Corbin had other statutory remedies available to him 
to request parenting time when he divorced M.F.’s mother.307 Thus, the 
court refused to fashion a separate equitable remedy.308 While the court 
acknowledged the Principles’ existence, it refused explicitly to adopt or 
reject them.309 The court noted, however, that even under the Principles’ 
                                                          
 297. Id., 768 A.2d at 599-600. 
 298. Id. ¶ 3, 768 A.2d at 600. 
 299. Id., 768 A.2d at 600. 
 300. Id. ¶ 4, 768 A.2d at 600. 
 301. Id., 768 A.2d at 600. 
 302. Id. ¶ 5, 768 A.2d at 600. 
 303. Id. ¶ 17, 768 A.2d at 603. Ultimately, the case settled, resulting in liberal visitation for 
Henderson but no further child support. See Telephone Interview with Hal Stewart, Attorney for 
John Henderson (Sept. 2, 2010). 
 304. 2001 ME 52, ¶ 25-26 & n.16, 768 A.2d at 605-06 & n.16. 
 305. 170 P.3d 601 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). 
 306. Id. at 602-03. 
 307. Id. at 603. 
 308. Id. at 605. 
 309. Id. 
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test for de facto parenthood, Corbin’s claim would have been barred 
because he failed to raise it within six months of living with M.F.310 
Some courts deliberately pass on the ALI’s test, believing that the 
legislature is the appropriate body to determine whether and when live-in 
partners should receive parental rights. For example, in Smith v. 
Gordon,311 the court declined to adopt the Principles, stating that it was 
the legislature’s duty to determine the answers to crucial questions like 
time limitations concerning de facto parenthood. There, a lesbian couple 
sought to adopt a child together, A.N.S., but because of Kazakhstani law, 
only one woman, Smith, was able to legally adopt A.N.S.312 From 
A.N.S.’s adoption in March 2003, Smith and Gordon shared child care 
expenses.313 Gordon did not seek to adopt A.N.S. before the couple 
broke up in May 2004.314 Smith permitted Gordon to visit A.N.S. until 
June 2004, at which time Gordon filed a petition for custody as a legal 
parent under the Uniform Parentage Act of Delaware (“DUPA”), arguing 
that she was A.N.S.’s de facto parent.315 The trial court agreed.316 The 
Supreme Court of Delaware reversed because although the Principles 
                                                          
 310. Id. Other cases in which the courts resolve claims of parental rights on grounds other than 
the ALI test include Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (Mass. 2002) and Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 
A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000). See infra app. C, Code 5, at 1176. 
  In Blixt, the plaintiff, the grandfather of the defendant mother’s child, sued for visitation 
rights under MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39D. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d at 1055. The Plymouth Division 
of the Probate and Family Court Department declared the statute unconstitutional and granted a 
motion to dismiss by the defendant mother. Id. at 1056. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts vacated the lower court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. 
The court noted that grandparents are not required to achieve de facto parent status in order to 
receive visitation rights, but applied past cases using the ALI’s de facto parent standards because the 
de facto parent standards were consistent with the existing standards for granting a grandparent 
visitation rights. Id. at 1061 & nn.15-16. 
  In Rubano, the court was also ultimately guided by something other than the ALI’s test. 
There, Rubano filed a petition in family court seeking de facto parent status and visitation with 
DiCenzo’s biological child (via artificial insemination) whom the couple had decided to have 
together during the course of their same-sex relationship. Rubano, 759 A.2d at 961-62. Rubano and 
DiCenzo negotiated a compromise giving Rubano visitation rights with the child in exchange for 
waiving her petition or any similar claims. Id. The chief judge of the family court entered their 
agreement as an order of the court. Id. DiCenzo violated the spirit of the agreement by interfering 
with Rubano’s visitation attempts, and Rubano sought enforcement from the court. Id. at 962-63. 
DiCenzo argued that the family court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order or enforce it; Rubano 
argued that the legislature had given the family court jurisdiction over matters like this and the court 
should enforce its order. Id. at 963. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled that the family court 
did have jurisdiction over the matter and should enforce the visitation agreement. Id. at 965-66, 970-
71. The court referred to the Principles, noting that the ALI’s treatment of de facto parenthood was 
“in harmony” with the position independently reached by the court. Id. at 974-75. 
 311. 968 A.2d 1 (Del. 2009). 
 312. Id. at 3. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. at 3-4 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8–101 to 8–904 (West 2006)). 
 316. Id. at 4. 
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would recognize former live-in partners as de facto parents, the 
Delaware legislature knew of the Principles when adopting DUPA but 
did not embrace the concept.317 The court concluded that “[p]roviding 
relief in such situations . . . is a public policy decision for the General 
Assembly to make.”318 
F. Courts Circumscribe the ALI’s Approach 
This is not to say that a close reading yields a uniformly negative 
approach to the Principles’ test. Some courts appear willing to embrace 
the test while sharply circumscribing the set of live-in partners who 
would be eligible. Killingbeck v. Killingbeck319 provides such a 
example.320 There, a mother was uncertain whether Killingbeck, whom 
                                                          
 317. Id. at 14-15. 
 318. Id. at 16. Subsequently, the Delaware legislature enacted DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8–
201(c), which permits individuals to bring parentage actions to be recognized as de facto parents 
when the adult: 
(1) Has had the support and consent of the child’s parent or parents who fostered the 
formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship between the child and the de 
facto parent; 
(2) Has exercised parental responsibility for the child as that term is defined in § 1101 of 
this title; and  
(3) Has acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established a 
bonded and dependent relationship with the child that is parental in nature. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8–201(c) (West Supp. 2010). Significantly, Delaware’s test for 
recognition as a de facto parent is considerably more demanding than the ALI’s. Moreover, once 
recognized as a de facto parent, the adult then has a duty to provide financial support for a child. See 
id. § 501 (imposing on parents a duty to support minor children). 
 319. 711 N.W.2d 759 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). 
 320. A number of dissenting opinions also cite to the Principles. See Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 
312, 326 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (Barker, J., dissenting); Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 96 
(Md. 2008) (Raker, J., dissenting) (citing to the Principles’ definition of de facto parenthood); 
E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 896-97 (Mass. 1999) (Fried, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority’s adoption of the Principles’ de facto parent standard); In re Marriage of Winczewski, 72 
P.3d 1012, 1058 (Or. 2003) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (per curiam). 
  In the case of In re Winczewski, the paternal grandparents of two children, A. and J., 
sought custody of the children after their father’s death. In re Winczewski, 72 P.3d at 1013. The trial 
court granted custody, finding that it was in the childrens’ best interests. Id. at 1013-14. On appeal, 
the Court of Appeals of Oregon agreed with the childrens’ mother that the trial court applied an 
incorrect standard. Id. at 1014. However, the court found that the mother benefitted from a 
rebuttable presumption of acting in the childrens’ best interests, but that the grandparents had 
successfully overcome this presumption. Id. at 1016, 1029. The lower court decision was affirmed 
by an equally divided court. Id. at 1012. The dissent cited the Principles when discussing the 
approach of other states’ courts which had granted grandparents who acted as parental figures the 
right to seek visitation with the child for whom they had cared. Id. at 1058 (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
  In Riepe, Cody Riepe, the son of David Riepe, went to live with his biological mother, 
Brandy Jo Riepe, after Cody’s father died. Cody had been living with his father and step-mother, 
Janet Riepe. Riepe, 91 P.3d at 313-14. Janet Riepe filed a petition for visitation rights with Cody. 
The lower court denied the petition, holding that under Arizona law, Janet was required to “prove 
that Cody’s relationship with her was equal to or superior to the relationship he shared with his legal 
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she later married, or Rosebrugh, was the father of her child, Devon.321 
Nonetheless, she and Killingbeck signed an acknowledgement of 
parentage, which stated that Killingbeck was Devon’s natural father.322 
After acknowledging Killingbeck’s paternity, Devon’s mother cohabited 
with him for four years, eventually marrying him.323 Six months after 
marrying Killingbeck, Devon’s mother filed for divorce and arranged 
with Rosebrugh for genetic testing, which revealed that Rosebrugh was 
Devon’s biological father.324 Rosebrugh intervened in the divorce action 
with respect to custody of Devon.325 The trial court revoked the 
acknowledgement of parentage but ordered parenting time for Mr. 
Killingbeck as a de facto father.326 On appeal, the Court of Appeals of 
Michigan reversed the order for parenting time, concluding that the 
doctrines of equitable parenthood and estoppel only applied to children 
born or conceived during the marriage.327 Because he would not qualify 
under this sharply circumscribed set of facts, Mr. Killingbeck had no 
right to parenting time as a de facto parent. However, the court decided 
that “the acknowledgement of parentage gave Killingbeck status as a 
parent, eligible to pursue parenting time under the Child Custody 
Act.”328 The court remanded with instructions to reconsider the 
revocation of the acknowledgement of parentage.329 The dissenting 
opinion cited the Principles and Youmans with respect to the definition 
of de facto parenthood.330 
While it remains to be seen what will ultimately come of the 
Principles, it is evident that the Principles have not significantly 
increased the chances that live-in partners will qualify for full parental 
rights. A significant number of courts have sided with mothers, 
preserving their ability to decide who receives access to their children. 
Even those cases that entertain claims by live-in partners and other 
                                                          
parents.” Id. at 313-15. The Court of Appeals of Arizona disagreed with this assessment, and 
reversed and remanded the case, stating that Arizona law “authorizes the court to award reasonable 
visitation under such circumstances if the factors set forth in that provision are otherwise satisfied.” 
Id. at 313. The dissenting opinion cited to the Principles and E.N.O. when discussing how courts 
outside of Arizona have defined “parent.” Id. at 326 (Barker, J., dissenting). 
 321. Killingbeck, 711 N.W.2d at 762. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. at 764-66. 
 328. Id. at 765. 
 329. Id. at 769. Furthermore, the trial court’s revocation of the acknowledgement was in error 
because “[r]evocation of an acknowledgement of parentage, even in cases where there is ‘clear and 
convincing evidence . . . that the man is not the father,’ must be warranted by the ‘equities of the 
case.’” Id. at 766 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.1011(3) (West 2002)). 
 330. Id. at 774 (Cooper, J., dissenting). 
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adults find that these adults do not qualify as de facto parents for 
purposes of visitation as often as the courts find that they do.331 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article is concerned with one question: whether heterosexual 
men who previously lived with a child and her mother should recieve 
unsupervised access to the child after the break-up, over the mother’s 
objections. The ALI’s Principles advance an easily administrable test 
based on chores and time-in-residence to decide when former partners 
would receive parental rights—a test that leaves little room for judicial 
discretion and judgment. The drafters of the Principles simply assume, 
without substantiation, that continuing contact between a child and a 
former live-in partner will almost always be an unadulterated good. 
However, the drafters ignore whether the adult and child have a bonded, 
dependent relationship of a parental nature. Indeed, in deciding which 
relationships to preserve, the Principles make no inquiry into whether a 
continuing relationship serves the child’s best interests or would 
safeguard the child’s welfare. In the years since the Principles were 
promulgated, courts have been reluctant to embrace full-blown parental 
rights based only on the bare showing of time-in-residence and chores 
performed for a child. The courts’ muted response to the Principles 
shows that judges have not followed the ALI’s lead in abandoning a 
more nuanced look at adult-child relationships. For many of the children 
involved, this is a good thing. 
                                                          
 331. See supra Figure 6; infra app. D, categories 2 & 5, at 1180-84. 
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 332. Our search results returned two additional cases that cited works containing the Principles 
in their title, but not the Principles themselves. See United States v. Batton, 602 F.3d 1191, 1201 
(10th Cir. 2010) (citing Wilson, supra note 1); Smith v. Smith, 769 N.W.2d 591, 593 (Mich. 2008) 
(citing Garrison, supra note 172). 
1160 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1103 
APPENDIX A 
Case: Citation: Ch.(s): 
Treatment 
Subject(s): Page(s): 





Super. Ct. Aug. 
27, 1999) 
2 Relocation *1-2 n.5 
Hawkes v. Spence 
2005 VT 57, 




Hayes v. Gallacher 
972 P.2d 1138 
(Nev. 1999) 
2 Relocation 1140-41 
Heatzig v. 
MacLean 
664 S.E.2d 347 










May 29, 2009) 
2 Relocation *2 
Hoover v. Hoover 






In re Audrey S. 
182 S.W.3d 838 






In re Care & Prot. 
of Sharlene 






In re Custody of 
Kali 











In re E.L.M.C. 











(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 





In re Giorgianna H. 
205 S.W.3d 508 
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Case: Citation: Ch.(s): 
Treatment 
Subject(s): Page(s): 
In re Guardianship 
of Estelle 
875 N.E.2d 515 






In re Guardianship 
of Victoria R. 
2009-NMCA-






In re Marr 
194 S.W.3d 490 











Ct. App. May 
17, 2006) 
2 Custody *8 
In re Marriage of 
Waller 
123 P.3d 310 
(Or. Ct. App. 
2005) 
2 Relocation 315 n.6 










In re Marriage of 
Winczewski 
72 P.3d 1012 








In re Parentage of 
L.B. 














In re Parentage of 
M.F. 
170 P.3d 601 







In re R.A. 
891 A.2d 564 
(N.H. 2005) 
2 Custody 580 
Ireland v. Ireland 
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Case: Citation: Ch.(s): 
Treatment 
Subject(s): Page(s): 
J.F. v. J.F. 
894 N.E.2d 617 
(Mass. App. Ct. 
2008) 
2 Custody 626-27 
Jacobs v. Jacobs 
2007 ME 14, 





Janice M. v. 
Margaret K. 




























2009 ME 96,  
979 A.2d 1269  
2 Relocation 1275 
Mason v. Coleman 



























2006 VT 78, 












Ct. Jan. 26, 
2000) 
2 Relocation *6 
Osmanagic v. 
Osmanagic 
2005 VT 37, 






Osterkamp v. Stiles 
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912 N.E.2d 489 






R.D. v. A.H. 






R.S. v. M.P. 
894 N.E.2d 634 








2000 ME 198, 






Riepe v. Riepe 
91 P.3d 312 











Rogers v. Parrish 
2007 VT 35, 





Rubano v. DiCenzo 







Schmitz v. Schmitz 
88 P.3d 1116 
(Alaska 2004) 
2 Parenting Plan 1123 
Smith v. Gordon 












Smith v. Jones 
868 N.E.2d 629 














2 Custody 593 
Stitham v. 
Henderson 
2001 ME 52, 











2005 ND 47, 
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Case: Citation: Ch.(s): 
Treatment 
Subject(s): Page(s): 





Super. Ct. Apr. 
19, 2002) 
2 Relocation *11 
Troxel v. Granville 






White v. Moody 
171 S.W.3d 187 






White v. White 
293 S.W.3d 1 






Woods v. Ryan 
2005 ND 92, 
696 N.W.2d 
508 
2 Custody 518-19 
Youmans v. Ramos 











Young v. Hector 
740 So. 2d 1153 














May 25, 2006) 
2 Relocation *2-3 
Acker v. Acker 







Ashby v. Ashby 
2010 UT 7,  






Austin v. Austin 
819 N.E.2d 623 
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Case: Citation: Ch.(s): 
Treatment 
Subject(s): Page(s): 
Boemio v. Boemio 








Braun v. Braun 
865 N.E.2d 814 









Brooks v. Piela 
814 N.E.2d 365 
(Mass. App. Ct. 
2004) 
3 Child Support 
368 n.5, 
369 n.8 
Clark v. Clark 
779 A.2d 42 
(Vt. 2001) 
3 Child Support 53-54 










Cullum v. Cullum 
160 P.3d 231 

















Dep’t of Human 
Res. v. Offutt 
459 S.E.2d 597 
(Ga. Ct. App. 
1995) 
3 Child Support 599 
Doucette v. 
Washburn 
2001 ME 38, 










056, 978 P.2d 
347  
3 Child Support 352-54 
Eyster v. Pechenik 
887 N.E.2d 272 






Franke v. Franke 







Garcia v. Mayer 
1996-NMCA-







Hartman v. Thew 
61 P.3d 548 
(Haw. Ct. App. 
2002) 
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Case: Citation: Ch.(s): 
Treatment 
Subject(s): Page(s): 




(Wash. Ct. App. 







2003 OK 48,  









Holman v. Holman 










In re Clark 
910 A.2d 1198 
(N.H. 2006) 
3 Child Support 1201 
In re Marriage of 
Bonds 






J.S. v. C.C. 
912 N.E.2d 933 
(Mass. 2009) 
3 Child Support 
941 
n.13 
Ketterle v. Ketterle 
814 N.E.2d 385 
(Mass. App. Ct. 
2004) 
3 Child Support 391-92 
Kittredge v. 
Kittredge 








Krize v. Krize 








L.M. v. R.L.R. 
888 N.E.2d 934 
(Mass. 2008) 





910 N.E.2d 947 
(Mass. App. Ct. 
2009) 
3 Child Support 951 n.7 
Mani v. Mani 








Martin v. Martin 
913 A.2d 451 
(Conn. App. Ct. 
2007) 
3 Child Support 458 n.6 
McCleary v. 
McCleary 
822 A.2d 460 
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Case: Citation: Ch.(s): 
Treatment 
Subject(s): Page(s): 
M.M.G. v. Graham 
152 P.3d 1005 
(Wash. 2007) 
3 Child Support 
1010 
n.4 
M.M.G. v. Graham 
99 P.3d 1248 
(Wash. Ct. App. 
2004) 












People v. Martinez 
70 P.3d 474 
(Colo. 2003) 
(en banc) 
3 Child Support 479 
Pierce v. Pierce 







Pursley v. Pursley 









697 N.E.2d 987 
(Mass. 1998) 
3 Child Support 992 n.8 
Salten v. Ackerman 
836 N.E.2d 323 









170 P.3d 643 
(Alaska 2007) 





886 A.2d 158 







Slorby v. Slorby 
2009 ND 11, 






Smith v. Francisco 
737 A.2d 1000 
(Del. 1999) 






77 P.3d 451 







Styka v. Styka 
1999-NMCA-
002, 972 P.2d 
16 
3 Child Support 20 
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U.S. v. Costigan 
No. 00-9-B-H, 
slip op. (D. Me. 





Warren v. Warren 
2005 ME 9,  















Weber v. Weber 



















911 A.2d 1077 
(Conn. 2007) 
3 Child Support 1082 
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DISCRETE CHAPTER 2 TREATMENTS OF THE PRINCIPLES 
APPENDIX B 
Case: Citation: Treatment Subject:  Page(s): 
A.H. v. M.P. 
857 N.E.2d 1061 
(Mass. 2006) 




A.H. v. M.P. 
857 N.E.2d 1061 
(Mass. 2006) 





A.H. v. M.P. 
857 N.E.2d 1061 
(Mass. 2006) 
Best Interests Test 1071 
Abbott v. 
Virusso 
862 N.E.2d 52  
(Mass. App. Ct. 2007) 
Best Interests Test 56 
Abbott v. 
Virusso 
862 N.E.2d 52  




862 N.E.2d 52  




Blixt v. Blixt 
774 N.E.2d 1052 
(Mass. 2002) 





805 A.2d 766  




2004 ME 43,  
845 A.2d 1146 
De Facto Parent 1152 
Dupré v. 
Dupré 
857 A.2d 242  
(R.I. 2004) 
Relocation 255, 258 
Dupré v. 
Dupré 
857 A.2d 242  
(R.I. 2004) 
Best Interests Test 255, 257 
Eccleston v. 
Bankosky 
780 N.E.2d 1266 
(Mass. 2003) 






711 N.E.2d 886  
(Mass. 1999) 





88 P.3d 1078  
(Alaska 2004) 






970401065S, 1999 WL 
712805 (Conn. Super. 




2005 VT 57,  






972 P.2d 1138  
(Nev. 1999) 
Relocation 1140-41 
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Case: Citation: Treatment Subject:  Page(s): 
Heatzig v. 
MacLean 
664 S.E.2d 347  
(N.C. Ct. App. 2008) 
Parent by Estoppel 351 
Heide v. Ying 
Ji 
No. 2008-270,  
2009 WL 2411561  















In re Audrey 
S. 
182 S.W.3d 838  
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) 
Best Interests Test 877 
In re Care & 
Prot. Sharlene 
840 N.E.2d 918  
(Mass. 2006) 
De Facto Parent 926 
In re Custody 
of Kali 
792 N.E.2d 635  
(Mass. 2003) 
Best Interests Test 644 
In re Custody 
of Kali 







100 P.3d 546  
(Colo. App. 2004) 
Best Interests Test 558 
In re Farag 
No. V-09449/99, 2001 
WL 1263324 (N.Y. 
Fam. Ct. Sept. 28, 
2001) 
Best Interests Test *1 
In re 
Giorgianna H. 
205 S.W.3d 508  
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) 




875 N.E.2d 515  
(Mass. App. Ct. 2007) 
De Facto Parent 521 
In re 
Guardianship 
of Victoria R. 
2009-NMCA-007,  
201 P.3d 169  
De Facto Parent 175 
In re Marr 
194 S.W.3d 490  
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) 
Best Interests Test 498 
In re Marriage 
of DeLuca 
No. A110788, 2006 
WL 1349348 (Cal. Ct. 
App. May 17, 2006) 
Custody *8 
In re Marriage 
of Waller 
123 P.3d 310  
(Or. Ct. App. 2005) 
Relocation 315 n.6 
In re Marriage 
of Hansen 
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Case: Citation: Treatment Subject:  Page(s): 
In re Marriage 
of 
Winczewski 
72 P.3d 1012  
(Or. Ct. App. 2003) 
(per curiam) 




122 P.3d 161  
(Wash. 2005) (en banc) 






122 P.3d 161  
(Wash. 2005) (en banc) 






170 P.3d 601  
(Wash. Ct. App. 2007) 
De Facto Parent 605 
In re R.A. 











J.F. v. J.F. 
894 N.E.2d 617  




2007 ME 14, 
915 A.2d 409  
Family Structure 411 
Janice M. v. 
Margaret K. 
948 A.2d 73  
(Md. 2008) 
De Facto Parent 74, 85 
Janice M. v. 
Margaret K. 
948 A.2d 73  
(Md. 2008) 
Parent by Estoppel 92 n.13 
Killingbeck v. 
Killingbeck 
711 N.W.2d 759 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2005) 
De Facto Parent 774 
Malenko v. 
Handrahan 
2009 ME 96,  




850 N.E.2d 513  
(Mass. 2006) 
Best Interests Test 518 
Mason v. 
Coleman 





2010 ND 40,  
779 N.W.2d 652  
De Facto Parent 666 
McAllister v. 
McAllister 
2010 ND 40, 





970 P.2d 1074  
(Nev. 1998) 




2006 VT 78,  
912 A.2d 951  
De Facto Parent 972 
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2006 VT 78,  
912 A.2d 951  
Parent by Estoppel 972 
Nighswander 
v. Sudick 
No. FA 97393793, 
2000 WL 157905 





2005 VT 37,  
872 A.2d 897  





235 P.3d 178  
(Alaska 2010) 





912 N.E.2d 489  




R.D. v. A.H. 
912 N.E.2d 958  
(Mass. 2009) 
De Facto Parent 963 
R.S. v. M.P. 
894 N.E.2d 634  






2000 ME 198, 
761 A.2d 291 
De Facto Parent 302, 307 
Riepe v. Riepe 
91 P.3d 312  
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) 
De Facto Parent 326 
Rogers v. 
Parrish 
2007 VT 35,  






759 A.2d 959  
(R.I. 2000) 
De Facto Parent 974-75 
Rubano v. 
DiCenzo 
759 A.2d 959  
(R.I. 2000) 
Parent by Estoppel 974-75 
Schmitz v. 
Schmitz 
88 P.3d 1116  
(Alaska 2004) 
Parenting Plan 1123 
Smith v. 
Gordon 
968 A.2d 1  
(Del. 2009) 





Smith v. Jones 
868 N.E.2d 629  
(Mass. App. Ct. 2007) 






Smith v. Jones 
868 N.E.2d 629  
(Mass. App. Ct. 2007) 





WL 163201 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Jan. 23, 2006) 
Custody 7 
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Case: Citation: Treatment Subject:  Page(s): 
Stitham v. 
Henderson 
2001 ME 52,  
768 A.2d 598  






2005 ND 47,  







2002 WL 983343 





530 U.S. 57 (2000) 
(Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) 
Best Interests Test 101 
White v. 
Moody 
171 S.W.3d 187  
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) 
Best Interests Test 193 
White v. 
White 
293 S.W.3d 1  
(Mo. Ct. App. 2009) 
De Facto Parent 14 
Woods v. 
Ryan 
2005 ND 92,  




711 N.E.2d 165  
(Mass. 1999) 







711 N.E.2d 165  
(Mass. 1999) 





740 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 






740 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1999) 
Caretaking Functions 1172 n.2 
Zalot v. 
Bianchi 
No. F598-7-95,  
2006 WL 5866285  
(Vt. May 25, 2006) 
Relocation *2-3 
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DE FACTO PARENT CASES 
APPENDIX C 





Eccleston v. Bankosky, 780 N.E.2d 
1266 (Mass. 2003) (de facto parent 
requires agreement). 
 
Youmans v. Ramos, 711 N.E.2d 165 
(Mass. 1999) (de facto parent, award of 
visitation serves child welfare). 
 
E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 
(Mass. 1999) (de facto parent; 
temporary visitation in best interests of 
child). 
 
Smith v. Jones, 868 N.E.2d 629 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2007) (failure to adopt child 
relevant to agreement to be de facto 
parent; allows consideration). 
4/1 
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In re Care & Prot. Sharlene, 840 
N.E.2d 918 (Mass. 2006) (modifies 
Youmans v. Ramos, 711 N.E.2d 165 
(Mass. 1999) and requires that the 
relationship between the child and adult 
be “loving and nurturing”). 
 
A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061 (Mass. 
2006) (de facto parent is threshold 
showing before best interests test for 
visitation). 
 
Smith v. Jones, 868 N.E.2d 629 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2007) (allows consideration of 
best interests and harm to child apart 
from de facto parent status). 
 
In re Guardianship of Estelle, 875 
N.E.2d 515 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (for 
visitation by guardians, need de facto 
parent status and showing of child’s 
welfare). 
 
In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 
(Wash. 2005) (en banc) (de facto parent 





to the Principles 
Stitham v. Henderson, 2001 ME 52, 
¶ 25-26, 768 A.2d 598, 605-606 & n.16 
(Saufley, J., concurring) (de facto 
parent gets continuing contact if in 
child’s best interests).  
 
Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, 
¶ 40, 761 A.2d 291, 306-07 (Wathen, 
C.J., concurring) (urging that de facto 
parents may receive visitation). 
 
McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, 
¶ 35, 779 N.W.2d 652, 666 (Crothers, 






existing tests  
 0/0 
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Code Treatment Number of Cases/Lines of Cases Tally 
5 
Use the 
Principles as a 
“pile-on” when 
the case would 
have come out 
this way anyway  
Osterkamp v. Stiles, 235 P.3d 178 
(Alaska 2010) (custody case referring 
to de facto parent). 
 
Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, 
761 A.2d 291 (grandparent visitation 
case, refers to de facto parent). 
 
Eccleston v. Bankosky, 780 N.E.2d 
1266 (Mass. 2003) (not deciding if de 
facto parent owes child support, 
support owed for other reasons). 
 
Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (Mass. 
2002) (de facto parent definition cited 
in grandparent visitation case). 
 
Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 
2000) (same-sex partner visitation, 
refers to de facto parent). 
 
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 
VT 78, 912 A.2d 951 (de facto 
parent/parent by estoppel, same-sex 
partner visitation in accordance with 
other cases and ALI). 
6/6 
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Code Treatment Number of Cases/Lines of Cases Tally 
6 
Make reference to 
the Principles, 
but otherwise 
decline to adopt 
the rule from the 
Principles 
C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 2004 ME 43, ¶ 14, 
845 A.2d 1146, 1152 (declines to adopt 
the ALI’s de facto parent standard, but 
concludes that the adult must have 
“fully and completely undertaken a 
permanent, unequivocal, committed 
and responsible parental role in the 
child’s life,” and be in the best 
interests).  
 
R.D. v. A.H., 912 N.E.2d 958 (Mass. 
2009) (de facto parent seeks custody 
but custody belongs to legal parent 
unless unfit).  
 
White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2009) (same-sex partner argues de 
facto parent, court says no authority for 
this).  
 
In re Guardianship of Victoria R., 
2009-NMCA-007, ¶ 16, 201 P.3d 169, 
177 (refers to de facto parent but finds 
that psychological parent may rebut 
presumption that biological parent acts 
in best interests of child and may 
establish extraordinary circumstances 
warranting the overriding of parental 
wishes if the child will suffer a 
“significant degree of depression”). 
4/4 
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Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312, 326, 337 
n.19 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (Barker, J., 
dissenting) (de facto parent).  
 
Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 
95 & n.2, 96 & n.3, 101 & n.5 (Md. 
2008) (Raker, J., dissenting) (de facto 
parent).  
 
E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 
896-97 (Mass. 1999) (Fried, J., 
dissenting) (de facto parent).  
 
Killingbeck v. Killingbeck, 711 
N.W.2d 759, 773 n.28 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2005) (Cooper, P.J., dissenting) (de 
facto parent).  
 
In re Marriage of Winczewski, 72 P.3d 
1012, 1058 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) 
(Brewer, J., dissenting) (per curiam) 
(de facto parent). 
5/5 
8 
Decline to adopt 
the Principles 
because it is a 
legislative 
question 
Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 14 (Del. 
2009) (declining to recognize de facto 
parent; legislature to decide crucial 
questions like time limit). 
1/1 
9 
Flat out rejects 
the Principles 
Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 
92-93 (Md. 2008) (de facto parent 
status for visitation short-circuits 





by a party but not 




A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 1070-
73 (Mass. 2006) (not deciding if de 
facto parent requires two years).  
 
In re Parentage of M.F., 170 P.3d 601, 
605 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (action for 
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12 
Cite the 
Principles for a 
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APPENDIX D 
What was Sought The Result Status of De Facto 
Parent 
1. Determined that the live-in partner or third party is a de facto parent entitled 
to full rights 
In C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 
the mother’s former 
same-sex partner 
sought a declaration of 
parental rights and 
responsibilities for the 
child and to prevent the 
partner from denying 
her parental status, 
while the mother 
argued that the court 
should limit the award 
to reasonable rights of 
contact. 2004 ME 43, 
¶ 5, 845 A.2d 1146, 
1147. 
The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Maine found 
that the partner was the 
child’s de facto parent 
because the parties 
stipulated to this status, 
therefore entitling her to 
be considered for an 
award of parental rights 
and responsibilities. Id. 
Former same-sex partner 
stipulated to be child’s 
de facto parent initially 
shared a residential 
schedule with the child’s 
mother;333 later the child 
moved in with the live-
in partner, who provided 
financial support for the 
child.334 
2. Determined that the live-in partner or third party is a de facto parent who 
receives less than full rights 
In Youmans v. Ramos, 
the trial court granted 
visitation to maternal 
aunt without receiving 
a petition from her 
after the father sought 
to terminate the 
guardianship held by 
the aunt and the aunt 
sought to retain 
custody. The father 
then sought to 
terminate the visitation 
The Supreme Judicial 
Court reinstated the 
aunt’s visitation after the 
court found her to be the 
child’s de facto parent. 
Id. 
Aunt is found to be de 
facto parent and 
awarded visitation. Id. 
                                                          
 333. E-mail from Kenneth P. Altshuler, Partner, Childs, Rundlett, Fifield, Shumway & 
Altshuler, to Merilys Huhn, Research Assistant to author (Aug. 27, 2010, 09:00 AM) (on file with 
the Hofstra Law Review). 
 334. E-mail from Mary Bonauto, Civil Rights Project Dir., Gay & Lesbian Advocates & 
Defenders, to Merilys Huhn, Research Assistant to author (Sept. 8, 2010, 1:59 PM) (on file with the 
Hofstra Law Review). 
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right in the Supreme 
Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts. 711 
N.E.2d 165, 167 
(Mass. 1999). 
In E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 
the birth mother’s 
former same-sex 
partner sought specific 
performance of the 
couple’s agreement to 
allow her to adopt the 
child (including joint 
custody and visitation), 
as well as a temporary 
visitation order 
pending trial. 711 
N.E.2d 886, 889 
(Mass. 1999). 
The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts 
reinstated the partner’s 
temporary visitation as 
the child’s de facto 
parent because it served 
the child’s best interests. 
Id. at 893. 
Former same-sex partner 
found to be de facto 
parent and awarded 
temporary visitation 
short-term, but 
biological mother left 
the court’s jurisdiction 
so no permanent order 
was entered. Id. at 892-
94. The majority cites 
the Principles for the 
definition of de facto 
parent. Id. at 891. The 
dissent cites the 
Principles to criticize 
the lack of limits on de 
facto parenthood. Id. at 
896 (Fried, J., 
dissenting). 
In Rubano v. DiCezno, 
the biological mother’s 
former same-sex 
domestic partner 
sought only de facto 
parent status and to 
enforce her permanent 
visitation agreement 
with the biological 
mother. 759 A.2d 959, 
962-63 (R.I. 2000). 
The Supreme Court of 
Rhode Island found that 
the partner was the 
child’s de facto parent 
and that the family court 
could enforce parties’ 
agreement to allow her 
visitation. Id. at 971. 
Former same-sex partner 
recognized as de facto 
parent and visitation 
agreement enforced. Id. 
In R.D. v. A.H., the 
former live-in 
girlfriend of the father 
sought permanent 
guardianship with 
custody against the 
biological father, but 
the trial court awarded 
The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts 
found that the de facto 
parent was not entitled 
to permanent 
guardianship with 
custody against the 
biological father because 
Former live-in girlfriend 
is a de facto parent but is 
only entitled to 
visitation. Id. at 968. 
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sole physical and legal 
custody to the father. 
912 N.E.2d 958, 960 
(Mass. 2009). 
the father was not an 
unfit parent. Id. at 961. 
3. Remanded for determination of rights 
In the case In re 
Guardianship of 
Estelle, the father 
sought sole 
guardianship after trial 
court granted co-
guardianship with the 
child’s maternal aunt 
and uncle. 875 N.E.2d 
515, 515-16 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2007). 
The Appellate Court of 
Massachusetts remanded 
to determine whether 
father was fit. Id. at 516. 
If he was not, the aunt 
and uncle would 
presumably retain legal 
guardianship. If he was 
fit, the father would 
receive custody and the 
court would have to 
determine if the aunt and 
uncle were de facto 
parents and had 
“continuing rights.” Id. 
at 520. 
Upon remand, father 
found to be unfit, 
received only visitation, 
and was ordered to pay 
child support, while aunt 
and uncle retained legal 
and physical custody.335 
In the case In re 
Parentage of L.B., the 
former same-sex 
partner of the 
biological mother 
sought to establish co-
parentage of the child 
(and sought all the 
rights and 
responsibilities of legal 
parentage available in 
Washington). 122 P.3d 
161, 164-65 (Wash. 
2005) (en banc). 
The Supreme Court of 
Washington found that 
the partner could 
petition for de facto 
parent status upon 
remand but could not 
receive visitation under 
Washington’s 
unconstitutional third 
party visitation statute. 
Id. at 163. 
Remanded to determine 
whether the former 
same-sex partner met 
test for de facto parent. 
Id. at 179. 
                                                          
 335. Telephone Interview with Roxann C. Tetreau, Partner, Eden, Rafferty, Tetreau & Erlich 
(Sept. 2, 2010); Telephone Interview with Mark I. Zarrow, Partner, Lian, Zarrow, Eynon, Shea & 
Spofford (Sept. 2, 2010). 
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In Stitham v. 
Henderson, the 
mother’s former 
husband sought to 
reverse a declaration 
that the biological 
father is the biological 
father under the 
doctrine of res judicata 
because the divorce 
settlement declared the 
former husband to be 
the father. The former 
husband also pursued a 
counterclaim of 
equitable parental 
rights. 2001 ME 52 
¶ 1-3, 6, 768 A.2d 598, 
599-600. 
The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Maine found 
that the former husband 
was the child’s de facto 
parent, but res judicata 
would not bar the 
biological father from 
seeking to be declared 
the biological father and 
that the former husband 
was not entitled to a jury 
trial on equitable 
parental rights. Id. ¶ 9, 
16-17, 768 A.2d at 601, 
603. The Supreme 
Judicial Court left it to 
the district court in the 
pending post-divorce 
action to consider if the 
former husband’s 
continued participation 
in the child’s life was in 
the child’s best interest. 
Id. ¶ 18, 768 A.2d at 
603-04. 
Former husband 
recognized as de facto 
parent but remands to 
consider what rights to 
be granted. Id. ¶ 17, 768 
A.2d at 603. The 
concurrence cites the 
Principles, urging the 
court to recognize the 
former husband as de 
facto parent. Id. ¶ 25, 
768 A.2d at 605-06 
(Saufley, J., concurring). 
4. De facto parent entitled to no rights 
In Killingbeck v. 
Killingbeck, the mother 
and biological father 
sought to terminate the 
alleged father’s 
parental rights but the 
circuit court awarded 
the alleged father 
separate parenting time 
with the child. 711 
N.W.2d 759, 762-63 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2005). 
The Court of Appeals of 
Michigan found that the 
alleged father was not 
entitled to parenting 
time as de facto parent, 
but remanded to 
consider whether 
vacating the revocation 
of the acknowledgement 
of parentage would grant 
him parental rights. Id. 
at 769. 
Alleged father is a de 
facto parent but has no 
rights to custody. Id. at 
765-68. The dissent cites 
the Principles for the 
definition of de facto 
parenthood. Id. at 773 
n.28 (Cooper, P.J., 
dissenting). 
5. Determined that the live-in partner or third party is not a de facto parent 
In Smith v. Jones, the 
adoptive mother’s 
former same-sex 
partner sought to be 
declared the child’s de 
The Appeals Court of 
Massachusetts found 
that the partner did not 
satisfy the criteria of 
being a de facto parent 
Court rejects de facto 
parent status. Id. at 632-
33. 
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facto parent, and 
requested joint legal 
and physical custody. 
868 N.E.2d 629, 630-
31 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2007). 
and awarded no 
visitation or custody. Id. 
at 631-33. 
In the case In re Care 
and Protection of 
Sharlene, the step-
father sought to be 
declared the child’s de 
facto parent and 
participate in medical 
decision-making. 840 
N.E.2d 918, 920 
(Mass. 2006). 
The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts 
found that the step-
father was not the 
child’s de facto parent 
and had no right to 
participate in medical 
decisions affecting the 
child. Id. 
Court rejects de facto 
parent status. Id. 
In A.H. v. M.P., the 
biological mother’s 
former same-sex 
partner sought parental 
rights of custody and 
visitation. 857 N.E.2d 
1061, 1064 (Mass. 
2006). 
The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts 
found that the partner 
was not a de facto parent 
and denied visitation and 
custody. Id. at 1069-70, 
1076. 
Court rejects de facto 
parent status. Id. at 
1070-73. 
In Osterkamp v. Stiles, 
the former foster father 
sought custody and 
visitation after his 
former domestic 
partner and the legal 
parent of the child 
began to limit his 
visitation. 235 P.3d 
178, 182 (Alaska 
2010). 
The Supreme Court of 
Alaska found that the 
former foster father was 
not the child’s 
psychological parent and 
not entitled to visitation 
because it would result 
in “continued exposure 
to the toxic relationship” 
between the former 
domestic partners. Id. at 
190. 
Court rejects de facto 
parent status and the 
former foster father may 
not receive parental 
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6. The live-in partner or third party received parental rights on some other 
basis 
In McAllister v. 




invitation to school 
events and progress 
reports, in the divorce 




and primary residential 
responsibility, which 
the district court gave 
to the mother. 2010 
ND 40 ¶ 1, 779 
N.W.2d 652, 654.  
The Supreme Court of 
North Dakota held that 
he was entitled to 
visitation and 
communication rights as 
the child’s psychological 
parent, but not decision-
making rights. Id. ¶ 27, 
779 N.W.2d at 662. 
Step-father gets the 
rights of psychological 
parent, which included 
visitation and 
communication, but not 
decision-making rights. 
Id., 779 N.W.2d at 662. 
The concurrence cites 
the Principles for the 
idea that legislatures, not 
courts, should devise 
grants of third party 
visitation. Id. ¶ 35, 779 
N.W.2d at 666 
(Crothers, J., 
concurring). 
In Miller-Jenkins v. 
Miller-Jenkins, the 
biological mother 
appealed the family 
court holding that 
former same-sex civil 
union partner was the 
legal parent of the 
child and thus entitled 
to visitation pending 
resolution of the 
dispute over custody 
and visitation. 2006 
VT 78, ¶ 1, 912 A.2d 
951, 955-56. 
The Supreme Court of 
Vermont found that the 
former same-sex partner 
was a legal parent of the 
child and entitled to 
temporary visitation, 
pending the resolution of 
the dispute over custody 
and visitation. Id. ¶ 2, 
912 A.2d at 956. 
Former same-sex partner 
found to be actual 
parent; cites the 
Principles to support the 
idea of parental rights 
for former same-sex 
partners. Id. ¶ 61, 912 
A.2d at 972. 
In the case In re 
Victoria R., the child’s 
adult caregivers sought 
legal recognition of 
their relationship with 
the child under the 
Kinship Guardianship 
Act and were awarded 
all legal rights and 
The court of appeals 
found that the adult 
caregivers satisfied the 
extraordinary 
circumstances required 
to sustain their 
appointment as 
guardians. Id. ¶ 16, 201 
P.3d at 177. 
The court of appeals 
cited the Principles to 
support idea of parental 
rights by child’s 
caregivers but awarded 
rights under more 
exacting “psychological 
parent” test. Id. ¶ 14, 
201 P.3d at 175. 
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duties of a parent, 
except the right to 
consent to the child’s 
adoption by the trial 
court. The mother was 
awarded substantial 
visitation, which she 
appealed in the Court 
of Appeals of New 
Mexico. 2009-NMCA-
007, ¶ 3 201 P.3d 169, 
170. 
In the case In re 
Marriage of 
Winczewski, the child’s 
grandparents sought 
custody, which the trial 
court awarded under 
the best interests of the 
child standard. The 
mother challenged this 
standard upon appeal 
to the Court of Appeals 
of Oregon. 72 P.3d 
1012, 1012 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2003) (per 
curiam). 
The court of appeals 
awarded custody to the 
grandparents under OR. 
REV. STAT. § 109.119 
(2001) after finding that 
mother was unfit and 
that the grandparent 
visitation statute was 
constitutional. Id. at 
1029, 1039. 
The grandparents 
receive visitation as 
grandparents. Id. at 
1039. The dissent cites 
the Principles to support 
visitation rights for 
caretakers. Id. at 1058 
(Brewer, J., dissenting). 
In Riepe v. Riepe, the 
widowed step-mother 
sought in loco parentis 
visitation under ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-
415(C) (2000). 91 P.3d 
312, 314 (Or. Ct. App. 
2004). 
The Court of Appeals of 
Arizona found that the 
widowed step-mother 
was entitled to pursue in 
loco parentis visitation 
on remand while mother 
remained sole parent 
with attendant rights and 
responsibilities. Id. at 
315. 
Step-mother may 
receive visitation for 
acting in loco parentis. 
Id. The dissent cites the 
Principles for example 
of courts awarding rights 
to de facto parents. Id. at 
326 (Barker, J., 
dissenting).  
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In Blixt v. Blixt, the 
maternal grandfather 
sought visitation under 
grandparent visitation 
statute. 774 N.E.2d 
1052, 1055 (Mass. 
2002). 
The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts 
remanded to consider 
whether grandparents 
could rebut a 
presumption that the 
parent’s decision not to 
allow visitation was 
valid. Id. at 1056. 
Grandparents may 
receive visitation on a 
basis other than being de 
facto parents; cites the 
Principles to support 
visitation rights by 
grandparents (“pile-
on”). Id. at 1061 n.15. 
In Rideout v. Riendeau, 
the child’s 
grandparents petitioned 
for visitation under the 
Grandparents 
Visitation Act, which 
required a “sufficient 
existing relationship 
between the 
grandparent and the 
child.” ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 19-A 
§ 1803(1)(B) (1998); 
2000 ME 198, ¶ 2, 16 
n.10, 761 A.2d 291, 
294, 298 n.10. 
The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Maine found 
the Grandparents 
Visitation Act to be 
constitutional, but 
remanded to consider 
whether visitation was 
appropriate under the 
facts. Rideout, ¶ 2, 761 
A.2d at 294. 
Grandparents could 
receive visitation but not 
because of de facto 
parent status, as 
suggested by 
concurrence. Id. ¶ 40, 
761 A.2d at 306-07 
(Wathen, C.J., 
concurring). 
7. The court rejects the idea of entitlement by live-in partners or third parties 
In White v. White, the 
mother’s former same-
sex partner sought a 
declaration of 
maternity, joint legal 
and physical custody, 
and child support. 293 
S.W.3d 1, 6 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2009). 
The Missouri Court of 
Appeals found that the 
partner was not entitled 
to pursue a claim of joint 
legal and physical 
custody because she 
lacked standing and 
failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could 
be granted. Id. at 11. 
Court declined to adopt 
test for de facto parent. 
Id. at 15. 
In Janice M. v. 
Margaret K., the 
adoptive mother’s 
former domestic 
partner sought custody 
of or visitation with the 
child. The trial court 
granted only visitation 
The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland found that the 
partner was not entitled 
to visitation as a de facto 
parent because 
Maryland did not 
recognize de facto 
parent status, but 
Former domestic partner 
not de facto parent. Id. at 
74, 87. The dissent cites 
the Principles arguing 
for recognition of de 
facto parenthood on the 
same level as a legal 
parenthood. Id. at 95 & 
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as a de facto parent, 
which the adoptive 
mother appealed. 948 
A.2d 73, 75 (Md. 
2008). 
remanded to consider 
whether exceptional 
circumstances existed to 
award visitation 
otherwise. Id. at 87, 93. 
n.2, 96 & n.3 (Raker, J., 
dissenting). 
In Smith v. Gordon, the 
adoptive mother’s 
former same-sex 
partner sought custody 
and visitation as the 
child’s de facto parent. 
The trial court granted 
joint legal and physical 
custody, which the 
adoptive mother 
appealed. 968 A.2d 1, 
4 (Del. 2009). 
The Supreme Court of 
Delaware found that the 
partner did not have 
standing to pursue 
custody and that 
Delaware does not 
recognize de facto 
parent status. Id. at 14-
15. 
Former same-sex partner 
not de facto parent. Id. at 
16. 
In the case In re 
Parentage of M.F., the 
former step-father 
sought to be declared 
de facto parent of the 
child and asked for 
residential parenting 
time with her. 170 P.3d 
601, 602 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2007). 
The Court of Appeals of 
Washington found that 
the former step-father 
not entitled to residential 
time with the child 
because Washington did 
not recognize a common 
law cause of action of de 
facto parenthood and 
because step-father 
failed to satisfy statutory 
requirements for 
modification of the 
parenting plan. Id. at 
603, 607. 
Former step-father not 
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8. The court did not reach the issue of whether live-in partner or third party 
was a de facto parent 
In Eccleston v. 
Bankosky, the child’s 
court-appointed 
guardian sought post-
minority child support 
from the child’s father 
as the child’s de facto 
parent. 780 N.E.2d 
1266, 1271 (Mass. 
2003). 
The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts 
did not reach the issue of 
whether to order the 
father to pay child 
support to court-
appointed guardian as 
the child’s de facto 
parent, but did order it 
pursuant to MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 215, § 6 
(2002). Id. at 1274-75. 
Court did not reach the 
question whether 
guardian is de facto 
parent. Id. at 1275 n.17. 
 
